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Abstract 
 
Collaboration in different forms has been a commonly used activity by farmers for a long 
time. These collaborations can take many different shapes and forms, from being simpler 
farmer clubs to multi-national cooperatives. However, most of them fill the function of being 
an intermediary between producer and market. In Sweden, Lantmännen is the largest 
agricultural cooperative with business both in Sweden and around the Baltic region. The 
association has up to 25 000 independent members. However, studies have shown that the 
growth of cooperatives may affect the trust and commitment of fellow members, as they feel 
further separated from the core decisions. In the latest years characterized by low profitability 
for agricultural firms, another form of collaboration has arisen. Producer organizations have 
been forming around Sweden, which often include a number of farmers in a local region who 
through collective negotiations try to lower prices on production factors and raise prices when 
selling grain. This type of collaboration between farmers that are members in Lantmännen 
could have a future impact on the Swedish grain market. This study aims to investigate and 
expand the understanding surrounding farmer’s collaboration through producer organizations 
and local associations. This is analyzed through a framework of drivers and trust within a 
collaboration as well as trust and loyalty towards the cooperative the farmers are a part of. 
The conclusion of this study shows that these collaborations have a financial and social effect 
on the respondents’ farms, that trust is high and that the trust towards the cooperative is varied 
however, the loyalty and frequency of trade still is high. 
 v 
Sammanfattning  
 
Samarbete i olika former har länge varit ett vanligt verktyg lantbrukare använder sig av för att 
skapa fördelar. Samarbeten kan ta många olika former och ske i många olika utföranden, från 
enklare sammanslutningar till multinationella kooperativ. De flesta fyller emellertid 
funktionen att vara mellanhand mellan producent och marknad. I Sverige är Lantmännen det 
största jordbrukssamarbetet med företag som täcker in hela den svenska marknaden men även 
stora områden kring Östersjön. Föreningen har runt 25 000 oberoende medlemmar. Studier 
har dock visat att kooperativens tillväxt kan påverka medlemmarnas förtroende och 
engagemang, eftersom de känner sig längre bort från kärnbesluten. Under de senaste åren 
präglade av låg lönsamhet för jordbruksföretag i Sverige, har en annan form av samarbete 
uppstått. Producentorganisationer har bildats runt om i Sverige, vilket ofta inkluderar ett antal 
lantbrukare i en lokal region som genom kollektiva förhandlingar försöker sänka priserna på 
produktionsfaktorer och höja priserna vid försäljning av spannmål.  
Denna typ av samarbete mellan jordbrukare som är medlemmar i Lantmännen kan få en 
framtida inverkan på den svenska spannmålsmarknaden. Denna studie syftar till att undersöka 
och utvidga förståelsen kring lantbrukarnas samarbete genom producentorganisationer.Vidare 
strävar uppsatsen till att förstå och identifiera vilka drivkrafter som ligger till grund för 
lantbrukare kopplade till Lantmännen, att starta dessa typer av producentorganisationer med 
andra jordbrukare i liknande positioner. Vi studerar dessutom skillnaderna i förtroende 
jämtemot det gemensamma kooperativet genom att analysera och jämföra 
producentorganisation med lokal förening kopplad till Lantmännen. Slutsatsen visar att dessa 
samarbeten har en finansiell effekt hos lantbrukarna, även sociala aspekter är viktiga när dessa 
aktörer bestämmer sig för att samarbeta ihop. Tilliten mellan parter i de utvalda samarbetena 
är höga, dock är tilliten till Lantmännen varierad men handelsfrekvensen fortfarande hög. 
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1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to explain the current situation for farmers and cooperatives in Sweden and 
how collaborating in form of producer organizations has increased. The chapter is concluded 
with the study’s aim and delimitations. 
 
Farmers have always tried to organize and collaborate in many different forms with the goal 
to increase profitability (Andersson, 2004). Collaboration is a way for farmers in the food 
supply chain to obtain benefits regarding economies of scale (Krejci & Beamon, 2015) or 
unlock exploitation of market opportunities (Simatupang et al., 2002). These collaborative 
activities may differ regarding resource allocation, intensity, and dependability between parts 
(Xu & Beamon, 2006). 
 
According to Stockbridge et al. (2003), farmer organizations operate on many different levels. 
Organizations such as smaller farmer clubs, groups with a small number of individual 
producers living near to each other. There are also larger organizations that are characterized 
by having a more substantial number of members and operate on a regional or national basis. 
Organizations like local associations, federations, unions and agricultural cooperatives. Many 
of these agricultural organizations act as intermediaries between producers and the market. 
 
A cooperative is a corporate structure, which aims to provide benefits and advantages to its 
members. The member trades with the cooperative but also owns and controls it. The 
ownership comprises mainly of members having shares, but they can also invest and trade 
with optional shares (Larsson & Lidebjer. 2015). In Sweden, Lantmännen economic 
association is the single largest agricultural cooperative and is owned by 25,000 Swedish 
farmers. Lantmännen economic association (Lantmännen) is today one-of-the largest groups 
within the areas of food, energy, and agriculture in northern Europe. (www, Lantmannen 1, 
2017) In Sweden, Lantmännen is the single largest agricultural company with more than 50% 
of the market shares when it comes to having equipment and machinery (www, Lantmannen 
2, 2017).  
 
During recent years, there have been numerous studies where data indicates that the members 
of Lantmännen have lower trust to their board of directors and the members are not satisfied 
with the cooperative’s business (Friis. 2011; Kihlén, 2007). Asymmetric information between 
Lantmännen and its members have increased and led to uncertainty and mistrust in the shared 
cooperative for minor farmers (Friis, 2011; Kihlén, 2007; Lindkvist & Stråkander, 2016). 
Trust between the members and the management, as well as among the members in 
agricultural cooperatives usually considered as one of the main advantages. Trust can help 
cooperative members to realize their economic and non-economic aims and is one of the 
sources of increasing the competitiveness of cooperatives, i.e., decreasing transaction costs 
(Szabó, G. G. 2009). James & Sykuta (2006) demonstrate that farmers trust in their 
cooperative is positively correlated to the inclination to trade with the cooperative and be a 
member of it. 
 
Swedish farmers are facing strained profitability due to several challenges during recent 
years. Farmers are increasingly exposed to markets with higher competition, resulting in 
lower product prices (Lantbrukets lönsamhet, 2015; Ekman & Gullstrand, 2006). Prices for 
production factors through intermediaries like Lantmännen have become more volatile, which 
has accelerated the need for farmers to adopt new market strategies in order to obtain 
sustainable margins. One strategy seen more frequently among Swedish grain farmers who 
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are members in Lantmännen is the formation of local producer organizations (www, ATL 1, 
2011; www, Ja 2, 2017; www, Ja 3, 2005). This form of collaboration between farmers aims 
to reduce prices on production factors and increase sales prices on products through 
negotiation with more capital and more significant volume. Another organizational formation 
between farmers may be found in the 22 local associations which are independent legal 
entities but connected to Lantmännen through the local association’s membership. These 
associations are found in the southern parts of Sweden, in Halland, Scania and Småland 
(www, Lantmännen, 2018). The local associations were formed as early as 1897 and have a 
spoken goal of increasing the profit of their own members in the region they operate through 
greater market power through combining quantities. (www, Alvseredslantman, 2018; www, 
Harplingelantman, 2018; www, Koingelantman, 2018) 
 
1.1 Problem background 
 
As both Swedish and foreign operations are exposed to severe competition, high efficiency is 
demanded. Today's market conditions imply both threats and opportunities for Lantmännen, 
and they require constant adjustment. As cooperative associations grow, the risk of members 
becoming less committed arises and their loyalty towards the association drops. Members 
consider themselves unable to control the association and do not therefore always act in its 
best interests (Kihlén, 2007). 
 
The objectives of the early economic association were to improve quality control, reduce 
purchase prices and transaction costs, and create better opportunities for experience sharing 
among farmers. Despite that, Swedish grain producers today are much larger than they were 
100 years ago and had more bargaining power towards the market, they are in a similar 
position, where they, in general, need to think about cost minimization rather than maximize 
the revenue (Carlsson et al., 2006). One of the differences on the Swedish grain market today 
is that farmers are collaborating through local producer organizations to an increasing extent. 
The European Commission defines producer organization as an informal association formed 
by individual farmers to enable them to organize and get together when it comes to 
negotiation situations and through that obtain a better bargaining position. Hence, more 
significant volumes and more capital is associated with these attempts (www. Ec.europa. 
2017). The same goes for the Swedish producer organizations, that act through an 
intermediary function that attempts to reduce purchase prices on input products and sell the 
members products to a higher price towards Lantmännen and other organizations. This type of 
new pre-cooperatives drives down their prices towards Lantmännen by negotiating with 
multiple organizations simultaneously (Johansson & Persson, 2013). The farmers that are 
collaborating through this kind of intermediary are of many cases, members in Lantmännen 
on an individual level but chooses to trade with the organization that produces the best prices, 
although they still obtain dividends from the memberships. In addition, this business model is 
becoming more and more common (www, ATL 1, 2011; www, Ja 2, 2017; www, ja 3, 2005). 
1.2 Problem statement 
According to previous studies, collaborations are conducted because benefits regarding the 
exploitation of market opportunities can be achieved (Simatupang et al., 2002; Xu & Beamon, 
2006). The spectrum of different arrangements for and against a cooperative as a form of 
collaboration is wide, but it seems that most of them are based on trust issues. As already, 
stated farmer members are characterized by a decreasing trust in Lantmännen (Friis, 2011; 
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Kihlén, 2007). The shrinking member control and decreasing trust in large cooperatives, as 
Lantmännen is, according to Harte (1997), a natural effect of better-functioning markets. As 
the cooperatives can no longer contribute to reducing the farmers’ transaction costs, the 
farmers will have less interest in the cooperatives. As the cooperatives try to adapt to the new 
market conditions, the farmers are affected (Fulton, 1995). 
Producer organizations is a phenomenon that could have a future impact on the Swedish grain 
market. As this type of informal producer organizations drives down their prices towards the 
cooperative, Lantmännen, by negotiating with multiple organizations simultaneously (Fearne, 
A. 1998). Agricultural cooperatives like Lantmännen have historically, and currently, served a 
useful purpose by providing farmers with bargaining power. However, with the five problems 
inherent in a traditional cooperative, Free-rider problem, Horizon problem, Portfolio problem, 
Control problem and Influence cost problem, the question could be raised whether 
cooperatives can survive in, or adapt to, a rapidly changing economic and political 
environment (Royer. 1999; Cook. 1995). Producer organizations are a type of free-rider 
problem and could become a future problem for Lantmännen and jeopardize the economic 
sustainability if members lose incentives to trade with Lantmännen due to side selling through 
these producer organizations (Bhuyan, 2007). In turn, this increases further mistrust, among 
the farmer that do trade with Lantmännen based on price differences and price discrimination, 
arises. 
Evaluations of the economic consequences of collaborative arrangements in agricultural firms 
have shown considerable economic gains (Larsén, 2008). However, a project at SLU 
(Diarienummer 0134001) where Larsén’s (2008) thesis is included, stresses the need for more 
research on the subject. At the same time, the phenomenon of local associations has been 
existing for centuries and resemble these newly formed organizations in the way the 
collaborate. An interesting question is what benefits could be achieved through joint 
procurement of production factors and marketing of products and how the trust and relation to 
the cooperative differs between these collaborative forms. Empirical studies of this problem 
are relatively scarce in both a national and an international perspective. Thus, this study can 
be described as a form of gap spotting (Sandberg & Alvesson, 2011). 
From a theoretical point of view, it is not possible to determine how Swedish grain farmers’ 
perception of how to trade with cooperatives have changed in recent times and how they 
chose to collaborate today. Hence, it is of interest to examine how farmers connected to 
Lantmännen choose to collaborate in negotiations and trade through producer organizations. 
By also adding the local associations into this study the authors are able to compare a newly 
formed collaborative form to an older, more stable form and draw conclusions about 
similarities and differences in collaborative elements and trust towards a cooperative. 
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1.3 Aim and research questions 
 
The study aims to increase the understanding of what drive farmers to collaborate through 
producer organizations, despite that they already are members of Lantmännen economic 
association. Moreover, what distinguishes producer organizations from local associations 
connected to Lantmännen? 
 
In order to achieve the aim, the following research question will be answered: 
 What are the drivers and continuity factors for farmers collaborating through producer 
organization in negotiations? 
 How do new more local collaborations affect relationships with a larger established 
cooperative in comparison to a local association? 
 What distinguishes producer organizations from local associations connected to 
Lantmännen and are there any differences regarding trust towards Lantmännen? 
1.4 Delimitations 
 
This thesis focuses on collaboration between farmers through producer organizations where 
the farmers are members in the cooperative Lantmännen and local associations connected to 
Lantmännen. The chosen respondents for the study are members in organizations, which aim 
to negotiate input and sales prices for the affiliated farmers. The study aims to mainly 
focusing on farmers with a primary production concentrating on grain. In order to answer the 
research question and achieve the aim, the geographical location of the studied organizations 
is of less interest. However, this study has chosen to search for respondents on the Swedish 
grain plains. Hence, the empirical background for the study show that these constellations are 
more common in those areas. Due to the approach and method of this study, the results cannot 
be generalized to all Swedish producer organizations or local associations within the 
agricultural sector. 
 
The definition of producer organizations is essential to narrow down and select case 
organizations. In this thesis, the definition of producer organizations is based on some joint 
procurement. It is further defined as an active and stated recurrent collaboration, e.g., buying 
fertilizers, herbicides, and pesticides or selling grain together and have an exchange of 
information. 
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1.5 Outline 
 
The following illustration in figure 1 describes the outline of this thesis. An introduction to 
the problem background and problem is given in chapter one (1). The chapter also contains 
the aim of the thesis, research question, and delimitations. Chapter two (3) presents the 
literature review with previous research regarding cooperatives, trust, and collaboration and 
also the theoretical framework. In chapter four (4) the approach and design of the thesis are 
presented. Furthermore, the procedure regarding data collection, presentation, analysis and 
ethical considerations are given in the chapter. A presentation of the producer organizations, 
local associations, the interviewed representatives and the results of the thesis is given in 
chapter six (6). Further, the analysis and discussion are presented in chapter seven (7), and the 
conclusions are presented in chapter eight (8). 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The outline of this thesis (own illustration). 
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2 Literature review & Theoretical framework 
Chapter three describes previous research conducted on the theme and field of the study. 
First, the literature review presents research the subject of collaboration and trust and ends 
with a summary. The second part of the chapter describes the design of the theoretical 
framework used in this study. 
2.1 Literature review 
 
When conducting the literature review the main base of literature was based around horizontal 
supply chain collaboration and the subject of social capital and its indicators. These concepts 
are discussed and presented in a broader perspective and is to be narrowed down and more 
specific in the theoretical framework. 
 
2.1.1 Supply Chain Collaboration 
 
Collaboration within a supply chain has been defined as a business strategy with the intention 
of creating mutual benefits between one or more parties (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2008). 
According to Naesens et al. (2007), there are mainly three types of collaborations: vertical, 
lateral and horizontal, within the supply chain. Vertical collaboration is defined as "a 
collaboration between parties sharing their responsibilities and resources to serve similar 
end customers such as manufacturers, distributors, carriers, and retailers." (Naesens et al., 
2007, p.32). Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) as well as Naesens et al. (2007) describes 
lateral collaboration as a combination of vertical and horizontal collaboration where the 
horizontal is described as a "collaboration between parties performing the same type of 
activities." (Naesens et al., 2007, p. 32). Further definition of the horizontal collaboration is "a 
business agreement between two or more companies at the same level in the supply chain or 
network in order to allow greater ease of work and cooperation to achieve a common 
objective." (Bahinipati et al., 2009, p. 880). One characteristic, which distinguishes horizontal 
from vertical collaborations, is the high degree of private information sharing (Simatupang & 
Sridharan, 2002). Another thing is good social relation (Larsén. 2008). One issue raised by 
Barratt (2004) in vertical supply chain is collaborative difficulties could become a problem 
when a large number of actors are included. Another dilemma is how define the goals within 
the own business but also within the business of the collaborative partner (Simatupang & 
Sridharan, 2004). Supply chain collaboration has been explained through numerous models, 
Barratt (2004) writes about key factors in his study regarding the basic foundations of supply 
chain collaboration and Simatupang and Sridharan (2008) propose a five-element design for 
further understanding. The designs are reminiscent of each other. The five-element design by 
Simatupang and Sridharan (2008) is built on five concepts: collaborative performance system, 
information sharing, decision synchronization, incentive alignment and innovative supply 
chain processes. The authors claim that these concepts need to be in balance in order to 
maintain a sustainable and long-term collaboration. Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) argue 
that opportunistic behavior among collaborative members may occur and lead to a greater risk 
of conflicts within the supply chain if these elements are not well maintained. However, 
according to Lambert et al., (1996) there exist certain facilitators influencing a partnership. 
These facilitators are elements that allow collaboration to grow and strengthen, such as 
corporate compatibility, similar managerial philosophy and techniques, mutuality, and 
symmetry (ibid.). These factors could lower the risks Simatupang and Sridharan (2002) 
highlight.  
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2.1.2 Analyzing collaboration in a supply chain 
 
The literature on supply chain analysis argues that vertical interdependencies for firms 
engaged in sequential stages of production require a systemic understanding of resource 
allocation and information flow between the firms (Christopher, 1998; Simchi-Levi et al., 
2000). Three core sources of value in the supply chain analysis are identified as “optimization 
of production and operations, reduction of transaction costs, and appropriation of property 
rights” (Lazzarini et al., 2001). Lazzarini et al. (2001, p.7) argues “Supply chain analysis is 
not well equipped to discuss relations among suppliers because it focuses on elements related 
to vertical transactions, such as logistics management or the design of contractual 
arrangements between buyers and suppliers.” Aitken (1998) supports the argument and Stuart 
et al., (1998) who implies that supply chain analysis could benefit from a network-based 
perspective of inter-firm relations. 
 
Network analysis provides a different perspective on collaboration within a supply chain. 
Network analysis is used to map the structure of inter-organizational relationships (Lazzarini 
et al., 2001). This way of analyzing is based on the recognition, that network structure has 
constraints and at the same time is shaped by the engaging firms’ actions (Granovetter, 1973; 
Burt, 1992; Nohria, 1992; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). Network analysis could help chart 
and evaluate social attachments and knowledge transfer between firms. The three core sources 
of value in network analysis are social structure, learning, and network externalities. In 
contrast to Supply chain analysis, Network analysis is not particularly concerned with 
vertically organized ties, but rather with horizontal relationships between firms belonging to a 
particular industry or group (Powell, 1990). 
 
2.1.3 Adopting Supply Chain Collaboration in Cooperatives 
 
Although both supply chain analysis and network analysis stress the importance of 
interdependencies between multiple firms and how inter-organizational relationships can be a 
source of competitive advantage (Dyer and Singh, 1998). The network analysis provides 
elements to evaluate social attachments and knowledge transfer between firms (Lazzarini et 
al., 2001). According to Lazzarini et al., (2001) the netchain approach is intending to 
integrate supply chain analysis and network analysis by recognizing that complex inter-
organizational settings embody several types of interdependencies, which are associated with 
distinct sources of value. A netchain is defined as a set of networks consisting of horizontal 
relations between firms within a particular industry or group. These networks are sequentially 
arranged based on the linkage between firms in different levels of the vertical chain. The 
perks with a netchain analysis is that it explicitly differentiates between horizontal and 
vertical relations, evaluating how agents in each layer are related to each other and agents in 
other layers (Lazzarini et al., 2001). This model could be a useful tool to evaluate not only 
how suppliers transact with a given buyer, but also how they interact between themselves to 
promote knowledge exchange, which has become very relevant according to Stuart et al., 
(1998) and the article written by Dyer and Nobeoka (2000). 
 
2.1.4 Agricultural Firm Collaboration 
 
According to Bonus (1986) cooperatives can serve as a social group on local levels. The 
formation of these reciprocal interdependencies between farmers is a result of intimate 
personal knowledge and strong social relations. Something that is characteristic of 
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communities in rural areas. In these contexts, farmers are likely to conduct joint decision-
making and problem solving to find ways to coordinate activities. This implies that 
interdependencies may positively affect vertical transactions between layers. In some 
agricultural cooperatives, there are members who are more prone to exchange information 
with the cooperative and reveal their strategies (Staatz, 1987). However, there are farmers that 
not only are members of the regional cooperative but also have interests in local farmer 
groups (Lazzarini et al., 2001). These farmers tend to share less strategic information vertical 
in the supply chain and instead try to promote information sharing to favor the collaboration 
within the same layer. According to Lazzarini, et al., (2001) it is increasingly important to 
analyze, not only the vertical patterns of ownership between organizations but also consider 
the nature of the interdependencies involving firms within the same layer. Farmers are 
producers of inputs to a vertical supply chain, and according to Lazzarini, et al. (2001, p.19) 
“layers that are more in the base of the hierarchical structure are more likely to present a 
higher proportion of reciprocal interdependencies due to social interactions among 
individual members.” Nevertheless, the author claims that "the Netchain framework helps to 
accomplish the simultaneous assessment of these interdependencies, and how they influence 
the nature of ownership ties." The author also uses the net chain framework to point out 
perceived values in a horizontal chain, which could be used to determine drivers for 
collaboration (ibid.). 
 
2.1.5 Social capital 
 
During the 1980’s an idea was formed on the area of economics which argued that the ever-
growing focus on behaviorally sterile firms moved the field away from the marketers and 
their transactions on a market. During the 1990’s researchers began to argue that mutual 
interest and reciprocity had to implemented into economic models. To capture these values 
the concept of social value was created. (Wilson, 2000) According to Putnam (2000, p. 19) 
social capital can be defined as “social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them”.  
 
Trust is viewed as the most vital indicator of an organization’s social capital (Woolcock, 
1998). Close synonyms to the term of trust are also mutuality, empathy, respect & solidarity. 
(Newton, 2001) There are multiple definitions of trust, however one commonly used 
definition deems trust as the degree of which one actor believes that another actor won’t 
exploit their vulnerability. (Morrow et al., 2004) It is further described by Nilsson et al. 
(2012) that if actors trust each other they will have an easier time to engage in productive 
collaborations and to “forgive” each other at potential mishaps. High trust may therefore 
lower the transaction costs for agents on a market (Hansmann, 1996) This, in turn, lowers 
actors’ costs of defending themselves from fraudulent behavior. (Stickel et al. 2009) Social 
capital and trust can aid in the understanding of why individuals act in a social context, for 
example in how they act towards a cooperative. (Larsson & Lidebjer, 2015) 
 
Loyalty is another term which is closely tied to social capital and trust. Loyal members are 
more prone to frequently trade with the association. (Morfi et al., 2015) Loyalty is closely tied 
to trust and the performance of the cooperative. (Morfi et al., 2015; Giannakas, 2001) 
Frequency can be defined as the frequency of trade between two parts (Feng et al., 2011). 
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 Trust in a cooperative context 
 
A cooperative is an association which is owned and controlled by its members. Members buy 
from and sell to the cooperative (Larsson & Lidebjer. 2015). Members thus have three roles in 
the cooperative, namely to own the company, to control it and to develop profitable trade with 
it (Nilsson, 2011). The traditional role of a cooperative has been to improve farmer 
profitability by lowering production and transaction costs in the market channel, 
counterbalancing the negative economic impacts of market power, and reducing producer 
income risks (Sexton & Iskow, 1993). In the context of agricultural cooperatives there is a 
need for social capital together with the financial capital. This is because farmers would not 
be a part of a cooperative if they can’t trust the business operations or the board. (Ollila et al., 
2014) When associations and cooperatives grow into complex structures the risk of losing the 
social capital, and, in turn, the trust in the board starts to decrease. When members start to feel 
unsatisfied in this way, the risk of members not trading or investing in the cooperative arises. 
(Nilsson et al. 2009) If trust is achieved between members and the cooperative the effect 
would be lowered transaction costs for both parties. Because costs for protecting oneself from 
fraudulent behavior and frequent trade is ensued. (Nilsson et al. 2012) Another important 
factor that has to do with members’ satisfaction is members’ loyalty to their agricultural 
cooperative (Morfi et al. 2015). To have loyal members regard the activity of buying or 
selling in a cooperative and therefore a vital financial aspect for a cooperative to respect 
(Feng et al., 2011).  
 
2.1.6 A critical perspective of a traditional cooperative 
 
There is a lot of research regarding the problems inherent in the traditional cooperative 
organizational form that create disadvantages for cooperative members (Vitaliano, 1983; 
Porter & Scully, 1987; Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). Cook (1995) presents five core problems, 
also discussed by Royer (1999), namely the free rider, horizon, portfolio, control, and 
influence cost problems. In this paper, three of these five problems are relevant to highlight 
due to the nature of the study, namely free rider, horizon and control problem. Feng et al. 
(2016) further claim that social capital is negatively associated with cooperative size. 
                                           
The free-rider problem emerges when property rights are untradeable, insecure, or are not 
sufficiently well defined and enforced to ensure that individuals bear the full cost of their 
actions or receive the full benefits they are entitled to (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). There are 
internal and external free-rider problems in cooperatives. The internal free-rider problem is a 
common property problem since the rights to residual claims in a traditional cooperative are 
linked to patronage instead of investment. New members receive the same patronage and 
residual rights as existing members although the new members are not required to make 
upfront investments proportionate to their use. An external free-rider problem is created 
whenever a cooperative provides its members with collective goods and services 
characterized by that other cannot be excluded. Consequently, non-member producers could 
receive benefits of the cooperative, such as favorable prices negotiated by a cooperative or 
where the value of a cooperative processing facility is capitalized into the value of a nearby 
non-member’s farm, this without contributing equity (Iliopoulos and Cook, 1999; Cook, 
1995; Royer, 1999). According to Feng et al. (2016), it is rational for a member to be a free 
rider in relation to other members. 
 
The horizon problem arises “when a member’s residual claim on the net income generated by 
an asset is shorter than the productive life of that asset” (Cook, 1995: 1156). Royer (1999) 
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develops the problematization further by pointing out that benefits received, as a result of an 
investment, in the cooperative are limited to the period (horizon) over which the member 
expects to patronize the cooperative. This may lead to members underinvesting in assets since 
the return they receive is less than the return generated by the assets. This problem is derived 
from the structure of the rights to residual claims, which are distributed to members as current 
payments. Another consequence this problem may have for a cooperative is the tendency for 
the cooperative to underinvest in assets with long term payoffs, i.e., research and development 
due to decision-making based on members’ perceived horizon (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). 
 
The portfolio problem occurs because members choose to invest in the cooperative in 
proportion to their use and because equity shares in the cooperative generally cannot be freely 
purchased or sold (Cook, 1995: 1157). This is a problem because, “members are unable to 
diversify their investment portfolios according to their wealth and preferences for risk-taking” 
(Royer, 1999: 55). This problem can result in numerous consequences according to Cook, 
1995 and Royer 1999.  Suboptimal investment portfolios, where the member has to accept 
more risk than they prefer, is one of them. This could set pressure on the cooperative to try to 
reduce risk, even if this means lower expected returns by reorganizing investment portfolios. 
In conventional cooperatives, potential outside investors, who could diversify the risks, are 
generally excluded from investing in a cooperative. Therefore, members have to carry these 
risks alone (ibid.). 
 
The control problem refers to the agency costs associated with trying to prevent a conflict of 
interest between owners and management. This is based on a principal-agent problem due to 
the divergence of interests between the principal, e.g., cooperative members, and the agent, 
e.g., management (Cook, 1995). This problem is difficult to get rid of in a cooperative due to 
the absence of an equity market for cooperative shares. Because this is not in place, it means 
that members are not able to monitor their cooperative’s value or evaluate managers’ 
performance (Royer, 1999).  
Influence costs problem is regarding “costs associated with activities in which members or 
groups within cooperation engage in an attempt to influence the decisions that affect the 
distribution of wealth or other benefits within an organization” (Royer, 1999: 56). 
 
 Five-stage cooperative life cycle 
 
Cook (1995) proposed a five-stage cooperative life cycle that seeks to explain the formation, 
growth and eventual decline of a cooperative. In the first stage, members who share the same 
clear economic objectives (Neto & Bachmann, 2016) categorize the organization process of 
the cooperative life cycle. Initially, there is calculus-based trust with the appearance of 
leadership within the organization, formed on the bases of members’ perception. In the 
second stage of the life cycle, the decision-making is transferred from the whole membership 
to the board of managers. Calculus-based trust is still present but transforms into knowledge-
based trust for a part of the members. This transformation of trust continues until all the trust 
can be characterized as knowledge-based. Evidently, trust between the members and the 
board is becoming a factor. Only this can create goodwill trust within the organization. In this 
phase, knowledge-based trust remains characteristic, and integrity-based trust coexists with a 
medium level of competence trust, with benevolence trust towards the board also becoming 
an important characteristic of the organization. In the third stage of the life cycle, cooperative 
growth process begins. The organization increases its efficiency, expands its economic 
services, and tries to achieve social efficiencies through superior economic results. To 
maintain social and economic cohesion, managers have to provide new services and social 
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assurance to members. Knowledge-based trust turns in to identity-based trust. The members 
experience a deep sense of belonging to the cooperative. The economic process in this stage 
requires the cooperative to look for more members of different type, to allow for 
diversification of agricultural processes and continuity in its economic growth. The new 
members may bring opportunistic behavior into the organization. In Stage 4, new members 
become the majority part of the organization. The economic functionality within the 
cooperation is not primarily built on commitment or trust but price mechanisms and expected 
profits from the organization. The cooperative has become a profit-driven organization. 
Cooperatives consider the addition of non-agricultural portfolios and the membership increase 
in number and heterogeneity. The membership significantly changes its characteristics; it is 
now heterogeneous, with rising free rider, horizon, and portfolio problems. The cooperative, 
at this stage, is usually a large organization, and its management is complex. The monitoring 
of economic activities by the members is difficult and opportunities to influence on decision-
making processes decrease. 
Price mechanisms and market orientation play a much bigger role than, i.e., benevolence, 
members trust or goodwill and the decisions are driven by market logics‖ rather than 
membership logics. In Stage 5, cooperatives are completely profit-driven, trust declines and is 
likely to be destroyed by the same speed as the membership heterogeneity and economic 
performance increase. When the level of trust is at the bottom, the cooperative might choose 
another organizational form. In this Stage, alternatives are available, such as exit, i.e., dissolve 
the cooperatives initial characteristics and becoming an IOF. However, most cooperatives try 
to rebuild organizational trust to recreate social linkages while not changing the property 
rights arrangements and maintains the cooperative characteristics and advantages (ibid.). 
 
 Structure of modern cooperatives  
 
In conclusion, when a cooperative matures, the members become increasingly aware of the 
five inherent problems, as well as the cooperating benefits that may have been lost in the 
matures process. These processes may consist of reduced transaction costs, trust, and 
commitment. Members and their leadership will have to consider their long-term strategic 
options and decide whether to exit, continue, or convert into another organization type. 
(Cook, 1995) Royer (1999) argues that if members want to adapt to or survive an evolving 
market, they have to exit or reorganize the organization. Thus, the cooperatives are entering 
the fifth stage in Cook’s (1995) life cycle. Further, the assumption can be made that trust, 
social capital and commitment are diminished towards the end of the cooperatives life cycle. 
This in accordance with Fulton (1999) who studied situations where cooperatives put their 
focus on the final consumers and retailers with the consequence that the member 
commitment, social capital, and trust was considerably reduced. Svendsen and Svendsen 
(2000), who showed that the trust was reduced in Danish cooperatives when growth occurred, 
and the dairy production was centralized, also demonstrate this. Fulton (1995) further explains 
that changes in the structure of agriculture have decreased the power of the cooperatives. As 
the cooperatives try to adapt to the new market conditions, the farmers are affected. Thus, the 
cooperatives are entering the fifth stage in Cook’s (1995) life cycle. 
 
2.1.7 Conclusion of literature review 
 
The literature review conducted by the authors is the basis for design of the theoretical 
framework used to analyze the data in this thesis. A review of existing literature has provided 
support for defining drivers for horizontal collaboration in a supply chain, these drivers are 
mainly financial and social in nature. Moreover, relevant facilitators and drivers for 
 12 
collaboration between actors in an agricultural context were also found. However, studies also 
show that for a collaboration to be maintained a great deal of trust is needed between actors. 
To transfer this part of the review to the theoretical framework the terms of financial and 
social drivers are constructed together with the important factor of trust. 
 
The area of social capital was also explored by the authors. Studies have shown that the most 
important indicator of social capital is trust. The phenomena regarding member loyalty 
towards a cooperative was also found to be affected by trust. The cooperative problems and 
five stage models also credit a lot of the troubles of a cooperative to lack of trust when 
complexity arises. To answer the research questions of this study, the authors have chosen to 
further develop trust in the theoretical framework to be able to more easily put each 
respondent in their unique context of trust towards the cooperative. As the concept of social 
capital and trust is large and contains a lot of different theories and perspective, such as 
transaction costs and lowered control costs this framework focuses on the perceived trust of 
the cooperative from the respondents and how or if this affects the business relation and 
loyalty between the actors. Trust is also presented in two different ways in the framework, 
both in the way of trust between collaborators (internal) and trust towards a larger cooperative 
(external). 
2.2 Design of theoretical framework 
 
The design of the theoretical framework is based on the literature review and its concluding 
remarks. To answer the research questions of the study, which are about both drivers for 
collaboration and the collaborations relation to a larger cooperative, the theoretical framework 
contains two theoretical perspectives. These are factors regarding horizontal collaboration and 
indicators of social capital, namely trust and loyalty. 
 
2.2.1 Factors and elements regarding horizontal collaboration 
 
According to Simatupang et al. (2002), a collaboration is initialized by identifying drivers for 
collaborative benefits. As collaborations are based on individual benefits for each firm, there 
have to be incentives that the collaborators can gain which would not have been possible if 
the firms acted alone. These activities can vary between increasing the profits for each firm 
and to enhance market power. Collaboration may also lower costs for logistics by 
coordinating the firms’ sales and delivery. This may also help manage a firm's storage 
operating costs (Addison et al., 2017). The literature surrounding alliance information is 
basically pointing out the same things. There has been an increasing frequency of alliance 
formation in recent years, which can be attributed to rapid changes in competitive 
environments. Thereby, the interest for the phenomenon of inter-firm alliances has increased, 
(Harrigan, 1986). There are a number of different reasons for a firm to enter an alliance or 
collaboration. This may include solving a market failure problem caused by transaction costs 
regarding asset specificity (Williamson, 1985), to strengthen positions and gain new 
economic possibilities (Porter and Fuller, 1986), and to achieve knowledge (Hamel, Doz, and 
Prahalad, 1989; Kogut, 1988). 
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Figure 2. A description of the decision to collaborate (Lambert et al., 1996; own modification). 
 
In the literature on horizontal collaboration as well as in the literature on alliance formation 
there are possible drivers that can explain why firms start collaborating or ally with each other 
(Chung et al., 2000). However, the literature also points out facilitators as a factor that could 
influence the decision to create a partnership (Lambert et al., 1996). Facilitators cannot be 
developed in the short run, they either, exist, or they do not. Thus, facilitators are elements 
that allow collaboration to grow and strengthen, such as corporate compatibility, similar 
managerial philosophy and techniques, mutuality, and symmetry (ibid.). 
 
 Financial aspects 
 
One of the main drivers for starting collaboration is economies of scale. (Ortmann & King, 
2007) Through collaboration and pooling of resources, farmers can improve their position in 
this regard. A form of collaborative work between farmers may include a joint purchase of 
farm inputs like seed, farm machinery, aiding members morally and financially during 
cultivation and seeking marketing channels for farm products to ensure better prices (Michelv 
& Vilalta-Perdomo, 2016). Another reason to start collaborating with other firms is to gain a 
market advantage (Lambert et al., 1996). Multiple parties that collaborate and have a strong 
integration between each other could supply a better and mixed portfolio, be given easy 
entries to new markets and provide better access to new technology and innovation (Lambert 
et al., 1996). To improve profitability is what most firms strive for in today's market. One 
way to do that could be to create a partnership with other firms (Lambert et al., 1996). By 
collaborating, firms may increase volume commitments, reduce variability in sales, gain 
access to joint use of assets and other improvements (Fearne, A. 1998). Fearne, A. (1998) 
further argues that costs sharing associated with developing new products and adopting new 
technology today are a great driver for collaboration in producer organizations. First, by 
pooling their resources and capabilities with those of other companies, firms can initiate 
projects that they could not have successfully done alone (Chung et al., 2000). This resource 
complementarity between firms derives from scholars in economics and business strategy 
(Richardson, 1972; Nohria and Garcia-Pont, 1991). 
 
 Social aspects 
 
Social aspects are really about social capital when assessing drivers for alliance formation.  
Very similar to resource complementarity, social capital in a firm is defined as its potentially 
beneficial relationships with external parties. (Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1990; Pennings, Lee, and 
Witteloostuijn, 1998). Social capital involves structures, such as interpersonal relationships 
and individual positions occupied by agents in a network. These structures are influencing 
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individual or collective behavior and performance (Lazzarini et al., 2001) and as pointed out 
by Granovetter (1985), the infrastructure, a collaboration between firms provide, could be 
beneficial. Social capital is concerning “resources accruing to an individual or group by their 
location in the network of their more or less durable social relations” (Adler and Kwon, 1999, 
p. 4). Chung et al., (2000), supported by Bourdieu and Wacquant, (1992), Coleman, (1990) 
and Gulati, (1995a) emphasize that social capital can function as a driver of alliance 
formation, thus it could decrease the cost of searching for new collaboration partners and 
create new economic opportunities. Chung et al., (2000) further expand on this by presenting 
three categories of social capital. 
 
Direct prior alliance experience is when a firm is in search of a collaborating partner to form a 
strategic alliance with the firm will tend first to consider previous partners or firms they have 
interacted with in the past. This is due to limited resources, uncertainty regarding how the 
alliance formation will perform in terms of costs and benefits and possibly increased risk. 
Another argument for this tendency is that searching for strangers when forming strategic 
alliances is hard to rationalize when trustworthy partners are already available. However, 
Chung et al., (2000) show that the optimal strategy for firms when developing relationships is 
to have a mix of partners, consisting of both those with strong ties to the firm and others that 
are foreign. This is because partners that the firm has had prior interaction with only provides 
marginal information value. Reciprocity in opportunity exchange is representing the trust-
based relationships, which is suggested to be beneficial for long-term partners because of a 
repetitive exchange of valuable information and opportunities. A key in this is to make it 
attractive to exchange cooperative opportunities with only a few selective long-term partners, 
given that each partner has the chance to give and take a certain amount of cooperative 
opportunities. Indirect prior alliance experience address does cases where two firms have an 
indirect connection through a third-party. This enhances the chances for the two firms to 
shape a strategic alliance because the indirect ties could become a channel for information and 
the third party has the ability to act as a reference and prevent opportunistic behavior between 
the parties. It will also allow the two firms to better understand, evaluate and trust each other 
through information provided by the third-party. Network analysis has, however, a different 
perspective concerning the type of social relationship and social structure that is more 
conducive to cooperative behavior (Lazzarini et al., 2001). Networks with agents strongly 
connected with each other are defined as repeated, affective, relational exchanges (Nelson, 
1989; Krackhardt, 1992).  
 
Farmers are not only supporting each other financially but morally as well (Michelv & 
Vilalta-Perdomo, 2016) Examples of said aspects considers the feeling of safety by having 
fellow partners close to the farm for support as a driver for collaboration. Social comfort by 
having friends and social bonds are also seen as positive aspects when collaborators join 
together in activities. (De Toro & Rosenqvist, 2005) Firms develop social capital through 
their participation in collaborations thus economic action is not independent of the social 
relationships surrounding an economic actor. To the contrary, Granovetter (1985) suggest that 
a rational decision-maker may find that it is advantageous to be sensitive and responsive to 
social relations. When engaging in social activities and growing social relations firms may 
reduce transaction costs when searching for important information and provide new economic 
opportunities (Baker, 1994; Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi, 1997). 
Fundamentals for collaboration 
 
According to Barrat (2004), a collaborative culture needs to be adopted by firms to create a 
collaboration successfully. Hence, firms are not usually able to support these kinds of 
 15 
operations. There are several factors, which are affecting the collaborative culture (Barrat & 
Green, 2001), e.g., one of them is trust (Barrat, 2004; Sahay, 2003). 
 
 Trust between actors in a collaboration 
 
Inter-organizational collaborations are complex processes and may, therefore, be difficult to 
implement for a lot of firms. (Barrat, 2004). The most crucial factors that shape the 
underlying culture of a collaboration is trust (Naesens et al., 2007). One of the main reasons 
way collaborations fail in practice is because of the lack of trust between actors. (Barrat, 
2004; Sahay, 2003) Collaborating parties must, therefore, make efforts to develop trust 
between each other. This is done by sharing information and resources, developing mutuality, 
keeping promises and acting openly and honestly. (Fawcett, 2012) 
Information exchange is important for operational performance and the maintained trust in the 
collaboration (Wiengarten et al., 2010). For collaboration to be successful, relevant 
information must flow between actors. When the information exchange between collaborative 
actor is of excellent quality, it reduces the information asymmetry. (Barrat, 2004) To achieve 
this state of information quality factors like accuracy, timeliness, relevance and the added 
value of said information is needed (Wiengarten et al., 2010). 
 
For collaborative activities to work all the parts connected must gain mutual benefits. In cases 
where only one part gains the benefits, the collaboration will end as the incentives are reduced 
for other actors. According to Lambert et al. (1996), the same goes for all kinds of 
partnership. Barret (2004) also states that if mutuality is not achieved one or more 
collaborators will start to feel too risk exposed comparing with fellow partners which severely 
reduces the collaborations functionality. Lambert et al. (1996) also state that both parties in a 
partnership must believe that they will receive significant in one or more areas and that these 
benefits would not be possible without the partnership. Such as benefits of asset/cost 
efficiency, marketing advantage, and profit stability/growth. 
 
To act honestly and open is essential in both an external and internal view of a firm's culture. 
(Hogarth-Scott, 1999). When dialogues between partners can be imbued with these two terms, 
it can often result in better certainty, reliability and information exchange. (Whipple & 
Frankel, 2000) Barrat (2004) mentions that shortcomings, like delays or other issues, must be 
communicated between partners for an honest environment to be developed. 
 
2.2.2 External trust 
 
Several studies have analyzed supplier-buyer relationships and arrived at the conclusion that 
trust is a critical variable in the development and maintenance of the relationships (Ellram, 
1995; Smeltzer, 1997). Lee and Billington (1992) expand on this view by suggesting that 
effective coordination of the supply chain is built on a foundation of trust. Smeltzer (1997) 
further argues that a holistic implementation of the supply chain needs a level of trust between 
all actors, the authors implies that this is external trust. 
 
 Trust towards an agricultural cooperative 
Trust is considered one of the most important factors in the context of cooperatives (Szabó, 
2009). Trust is the extent to which one believes that others will not act to exploit one’s 
vulnerabilities (Barney & Hansen, 1994; McAllister, 1995; Sabel, 1993). Therefore, trust has 
been labeled as the main advantage, which can help cooperative members to realize their 
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economic and non-economic goals of the cooperative. Farmers connected to agricultural 
cooperatives will in general, seek to satisfy their social goals with the membership, through 
interactions with other members and thus an affective based trust develops between members. 
Simultaneously, farmers will in general, satisfy their economic goals through interactions 
with the management and the trust that develops between the parties will be more cognitive. 
(Hansen, et al., 2002). However, Hansen et al. (2002) recognize that trust among members 
and the trust between members and management could both consist of cognitive and affective 
elements, respectively. Differences in these two typologies of trust result in differences in 
outcome from the farmers’ cooperative membership in terms of performance and satisfaction 
(Barney & Hansen, 1994; Dyer, 1997; Gulati, 1995; Sako, 1992). Members of farmer-owned 
cooperatives will make qualitative assessments concerning the performance of their 
membership, involving financial indicators such as, whether their membership results in 
increased revenue and profits, but also non-financial indicators regarding their level of 
satisfaction with the cooperative in general (Hansen et al., 2002). However, Fulton & 
Giannakas (2001) argue that satisfaction with the cooperative is mainly related to the 
proﬁtability that the members experience at their farm enterprises. 
According to Szabó (2009) the trust, which exists between the members and the management 
of a cooperative, is one of the sources of increased competitiveness, i.e., decreasing 
transaction costs. However, Feng et al. (2016) stress that cooperatives’ development towards 
large size might have led to less member involvement, less trust within the membership, less 
satisfaction, and less member loyalty. Dyer et al. (2003) explain further the existence of an 
inverse relationship between trust and transaction costs in a supplier-buyer relation. Dyer et 
al. (2003) identify that trust may reduce transaction costs in a number of ways. First, actors 
will spend less time on ex-ante contracting because they are confident that payoffs will be 
fairly divided. The transactor will spend less time on negotiation for the same reason, and 
there will be less need for monitoring and enforcement of the transaction. This also implies 
that low trust could increase transaction cost (Zaheer et al., 1998). 
According to Lambert & Knemeyer (2004) facilitators are, together with drivers, creating 
incentives for collaboration. Facilitators can be described as supportive factors in the business 
environment that allow the enhancement of partnerships. As trust towards the cooperative is 
important in the context of a farmer. It is seen as a facilitator to form the kinds of producer 
organizations examine in this study. 
 
 Loyalty 
Loyalty is based on the behavior and attitudes of an individual. Loyalty may often regard the 
activity of buying or selling in a cooperative but may also include other roles, such as a 
member’s activities surrounding monitoring and investing. (Feng et al., 2011) Loyalty is also 
seen as an expression of individuals repeated behavior (Morfi et al., 2015). When handling 
increasing competition cooperatives often act by adapting strategies of integration in either 
vertical or horizontal levels (Van der Kroght et al., 2009). These kinds of restructuring can 
contribute to larger operations that are more complex and need to be handled by the 
cooperative and its members. These strategies and operations also tend to create a vision of 
the cooperative of being more similar to an investor-owned firm. A result of this may be that 
the loyalty of said members diminish because they tend to become alienated within the 
membership (Nilsson et al., 2007). 
 
According to Morfi et al. (2015), there are several important factors regarding farmers’ 
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loyalty and frequency when trading with the cooperative. The cooperative has to be viewed as 
an assured market channel by the members in the cooperative, which means that the 
cooperative has to offer a reliable channel for the members produced commodities to reduce 
costs of transactions. The perception of the cooperative as an assured market for individual 
farmers is one of the most vital aspects of a higher loyalty towards the cooperative (Bravo-
Ureta & Lee, 1988; Jensen, 1990). Another factor is the business orientation. Farmers, like 
other businesses, tend to shift partners if they find better conditions (Karantininis & Zago, 
2001). However, some farmers may choose to find and act on the best deals for the moment 
while others prefer the cooperative choice even if an investor-owned firm has a better pricing 
condition, because of the thought that the cooperative can offer something more valuable on a 
longer term (Fulton, 1998). This may be the case because of the high investment specific 
costs a farm has created a need for a longer planning horizon and a way to safeguard oneself 
from fraudulent partners (Morfi et al., 2015). 
2.2.3 Description of the Theoretical Framework 
 
 
Figure 3. A description of the theoretical framework for the thesis (Lambert et al., 1996; Fawcett et al., 2012; 
own modification) 
 
The theoretical framework in this thesis consists of partnership theory based on Lambert et 
al., (1996) and the experience of alliance formation from the U.S. investment banking 
industry, as well as supply chain collaboration theory. The partnership theory basis is the 
understanding of drivers and facilitators as factors influencing the decision to create a 
partnership. The drivers identified by a literature review has been tied to financial aspects, 
such as economies of scale and cost reduction, to social aspects, regarding senses of security 
and social bonds. However, drivers are not enough for a collaboration to be maintained as 
trust is a vital factor for continuous participation (Barrat, 2004; Naesens et al., 2007). 
According to Fawcett et al. (2012) a high level of trust can be achieved by sharing 
information and resources, participants feeling mutuality and an atmosphere of honesty and 
openness. In the last part of the framework trust and loyalty towards the cooperative is 
examined as to determine the attitudes and business orientation of participants in the producer 
organizations and local associations. 
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3 Method 
 
In this chapter, the chosen research methodology is presented and motivated. The chapter 
explores the chosen design, unit of analysis and the handling of data during the process. 
3.1 Research design 
The aim of this study is to increase the understanding of what drive farmers to collaborate 
through producer organizations and how their trust is compared to members of local 
associations. This is done by obtaining the perspectives of both individual members of both 
producer organizations, and local associations must be studied. A qualitative approach has a 
focus on understanding phenomena in its specific setting with non-numerical data. This 
enables ways to get a deeper understanding of an individual's perspective. (Robson, 2011) 
While quantitive research designs acknowledge a measurable and objective reality the 
qualitative design instead argues that there are many different realities, which arise and 
change due to the social interactions between individuals. When social interactions such as 
conversations and actions are interpreted, these realities are created (Merriam, 1994). This 
gives the qualitative approach the ability to emphasize and interpret the complexity of the 
studied case. This thesis intends to increase knowledge about members in producer 
organizations and local associations in terms of their perception of drivers and trust. 
Therefore, the qualitative research design is deemed as suitable. 
This study’s ontological standpoint is of the social constructionistic view which assumes that 
a social phenomenon is constructed by interactions between social actors within a set social 
context. This implies that a social reality is constantly changing and not final (Bryman & Bell, 
2015). The authors of this study also employ the epistemological perspective of 
interpretivism. This standpoint focuses on the human action and how to understand it, the 
interpretive view indicate that the activity of social actors creates society and culture which 
makes scientists strive to examine the specific social context. (ibid.) 
This paper is mainly based on an inductive approach, which bases itself on the idea that 
theory is the result of the study and not the foundation of it. (Bryman & Bell, 2015) It is 
therefore present during the process of data collection where data is categorized into themes 
and thereafter theories are found to analyze that data (ibid.). The authors have been doing 
literature searches before and after the data collection process to be able to identify important 
factors that might otherwise have gone missing. Changes were made in social drivers, 
external trust and loyalty as the time of the study progressed to allow for a wider perspective. 
However, some of these themes of theory were considered before the data collection and were 
the main themes in which formed the interview guide. Which makes the study approach 
somewhat deductive as well (Bryman & Bell, 2015) However, the literature used is applied in 
a new field and context, which Bryman & Bell (2015) argues may be an inductive approach 
too. 
3.2 Literature review 
 
To gain confidence in the studies issues, it is important to be familiar with the literature in the 
field of the subject. (Yin, 2013) A literature review is conducted to identify knowledge gap 
and areas of interest. This, in turn, guides the research into more a relevant analysis and 
contribution to said subject (Robson, 2011). 
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To be able to construct the theoretical framework for this study a cluster of literature covering 
collaboration and cooperative theory was collected and reviewed. The literature review is 
conducted using scientific papers found in databases such as Google Scholar, Web of Science 
and Primo. As the literature review provides the vital foundation to the framework, the 
analysis and, in extent, the conclusions of this study the quality of it has to be ensured. This is 
done by collecting data from a wide array of journals and articles and by making sure said 
articles are well-cited, discussed and to verify that all the material and data used is peer-
reviewed to increase the study’s trustworthiness further.  
 
Table 1. Search words in order to conduct a literature review 
Search words 
Agriculture + Cooperative +  Collaboration + Alliance formation + 
Pre-cooperative  Trust Drivers Drivers  
Collaboration Side-selling Facilitators Facilitators 
Producer organizations Loyalty Supply chain Agricultural firms 
Organizations 
 
Horizontal 
 
 
3.3 Multiple case study 
As the research in the field of collaboration in purchase and sales activities in Swedish 
agriculture is a relatively unexplored problem, a case study is a suitable tool to use (Yin, 
2013). It is also suitable to use a case study when creating an understanding regarding a case 
in its unique context (Bryman & Bell, 2015). A case can be an individual, but also a group or 
a situation and aims to increase the understanding of a specific phenomenon (Robson, 2011).  
 
Case studies are not necessarily restricted to only one studied case; a multiple case study can 
be used as well (Bryman & Bell, 2015). When using multiple cases, the results can be seen as 
more rigorous. When comparing two different cases, a better foundation may also be given to 
observe under what circumstances a theory is connected to the data. (ibid.) However, the data 
might not be as detailed as the results from a single case study could be (Yin, 2006).  
Both of the case groups in this thesis are identified as collaborative structures in a cooperative 
context. However, as there are variations in structure and age between the case groups, and 
that the previous studies are scarce on both types of collaborations, the authors saw an 
interesting opportunity to examine how drivers and trust towards the cooperative are 
perceived in their specific environment A comparative case study is distinguished by its focus 
to examine two or more contrasting cases and draw conclusions from the similarities and 
differences between those cases (Bryman & Bell, 2015). The cases are individual farmers 
who stem from one of two different ways of horizontal collaborations, mainly through a 
producer organization or a local association.  
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3.4 Empirical Data 
 
3.4.1 Choice of cases 
 
A lot can be said and discussed about the quantity of respondents in a case study. However, 
Eisenhardt (1989, p. 545) argues that a range between four and ten respondents usually 
succeeds in getting a rich amount of data, if the number of the respondent is too great there is 
a risk of the data being too complex and, in some cases, redundant (ibid.). This study, 
therefore, chooses to use eight respondents from each case to get rich and deep data from the 
different contexts. For this multiple case study, eight pairs of respondents from collaborating 
structures were interviewed. Four pairs were farmers from the same producer organizations, 
and four pairs were CEO and a farmer who as well was a board member from a local 
association. 
 
To answer the research questions, the authors have chosen to examine producer organizations 
and local associations. The respondents consist of two representatives from four different 
producer organizations and two representatives from four local associations around Sweden 
that all have the goal to decrease input prices and increase sales profit. The representatives 
from the producer organizations consist of members in the informal formation while the 
representatives from the local associations consist of one board member and the CEO of each 
association. This was done to get a perspective from a representative of the members as well 
as the representatives of the associations business model and trade. Moreover, the respondents 
are connected to Lantmännen either direct as a member or indirect as a member of a local 
association. Yin (2009) suggests that a number of two or three case studies is appropriate to 
be able to examine and analyze a phenomenon properly. The reason why this study has 
chosen to select four cases with a minimum of two respondents of each characteristic is due to 
the fact that there are not any earlier studies carried out on this specific phenomenon and 
therefore there is very few if any empirical observations to compare the results with.  
 
 
Figure 4. Composition of the two respondent groups of collaborating organizations (own illustration). 
 
This thesis applies a comparative case study which examines the drivers and facilitators 
between farmers included in a producer organization and farmers in a local association. A 
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motive to a comparative design is to create a greater understanding of the phenomena and to 
generate a clearer logic to the studied context. (Bryman & Bell, 2015). Lijphart (1971) 
describe some crucial factors that need to be present for a successful comparative study. One 
critical criterion is to focus on the comparability between the objects. This implies that the 
objects studied need to have certain similar variables which can be viewed as constant while 
also having some discrepancies. 
 
When selecting cases for a study two types of sampling is used, either on non-probability 
samples or probability samples (Robson, 2011) However, as qualitative studies usually do not 
aim to generalize the results, they are often based on non-probability sampling. (Merriam, 
1994) Hence, purposive sampling is recurring in qualitative research, meaning that the 
researcher chooses the sample from the amount of knowledge that could be gained. In studies, 
this statement translates to choosing cases that answer the research questions in a satisfactory 
way. (Bryman & Bell, 2015) In this study, the respondents were chosen to represent both 
parts of the collaborating structures studied. In terms of the producer organizations, the 
structures asked had at least four members with a minimum of a few hundred hectares which 
were mainly trading in production factors and grain. The local associations were chosen to 
represent the varying sizes of existing associations to get varied data and perspectives. To 
reach out to the local associations, the authors had a dialogue with Lantmännen who reached 
out to them and were the first contact for this study.  
 
3.4.2 Data collection 
 
The study applies the semi-structured, face-to-face interviews in which an interview guide 
with predetermined questions on specific themes (Bryman & Bell, 2015). This interview 
methodology is flexible, allows for respondents’ personal approaches and allows additional 
questions beyond those defined in the interview guide (Robson, 2011). This also enables the 
researchers to adapt the data collection to unique and interesting points, and themes brought 
up by different respondents (Bryman & Bell, 2015; Robson, 2011) The interview form also 
increases the chances of connections between the theoretical concepts and the empirical data 
(Bryman & Bell, 2015) However, this type of flexible data collection requires researchers 
who understand that they now are a more vital part of the interviewing process (Robson, 
2011). The authors have had this in mind during the interview process and have been active 
and asking follow-up questions on parts in the questionnaire where it was deemed necessary.   
 
Before the interviews were conducted, a pilot interview was done with a farmer who also is a 
part of a producer organization. This was done to see if the interview guide was suitable for 
the study. It is important to see if the questions collect relevant data and that they are 
formulated in a way that makes them easy to understand (Robson, 2011). Some adjustments 
were made after the pilot interview to further align with these two aspects. Interviews were 
carried out between March 27 to April 18. Before each interview, the respondents were 
contacted and given a brief description of the study and the questions to come. After the 
contact the questions were also sent to the respondent beforehand, these are presented in 
Appendix 2. The interviews took between 60 to 90 minutes to complete and were conducted 
with farmers who were a part of a producer organizations and CEO and board member of 
local associations. The respondents were interviewed separately to assure that the data 
collected was purely their own perspective. 
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3.4.3 Data analysis 
 
The result of the analysis is to link the empirical findings made with the constructed 
theoretical framework conducted. Data analysis is done differently in quantitative and 
qualitative research where the former handles numbers and the latter handles text. (Miles et 
al., 2013) The analytical process in a qualitative research design consists of three steps; 
description, systematization and categorization and lastly, combination (Jacobsen, 2002). If an 
interview guide has been constructed for the study, the themes handled in it can act as a base 
for the categorization in the study. However, categories can also emerge from trends and 
similarities of the empirical data. (ibid.) Furthermore, Yin (2003) explains that to easily keep 
the case study evidence structured and in order temporal schemes or matrices should be used. 
Similarities and differences between units should also be presented and illustrated. (Jacobsen, 
2002) To be able to present similarities and differences between producer organizations and 
local associations the techniques brought up earlier in the paragraph will be used. The aim of 
the analysis is to link empirical findings with the theoretical framework, therefore, throughout 
this process, data is categorized with themes founded on the interview guide and presented in 
tables/matrices with respect to the four areas in the theoretical framework. In order to create 
an analysis understandable for the reader, the analysis is structured in the same way.  
3.5 Quality assurance 
 
The case study approach has been questioned because of doubt about the scientific value 
(Flyvberg, 2006). This makes it especially crucial for a researcher to ensure quality to meet 
the criticism the method entails (Yin, 2013). To be able to ensure the quality of a qualitative 
case study, it is important to have internal and external validity. Internal validity is the extent 
to which a contributing conclusion based on a study is defensible, which is determined by the 
degree to which a study minimizes systematic error or bias (Lewis-Beck, M. S., et al. 2004).  
It contrasts with external validity, often more measured in quantitative research, the degree to 
which it is defensible to generalize results to a population or other contexts (ibid.). To achieve 
internal validity in qualitative research, the key is to ensure that the study measures or tests 
what is actually intended.  To be able to do that, it is important to achieve a high level of 
validity and reliability in the research (Robson, 2011). Riege (2003) has developed a set of 
techniques for establishing validity and reliability in case studies by combine extensive 
literature on the subject (table 2). 
 
In order to ensure validity, this thesis uses multiple sources to gather evidence, such as 
personal information via telephone and personal interviews, to get perspectives of different 
actors. All interviews are transcribed, and the transcripts are sent together with follow-up 
emails to the respondent. To ensure internal validity, all interviews are conducted with the 
same interview guide (see appendix 1). Tables and charts are used in the analysis to assist the 
understanding and explanation of the phenomenon. Delimitations of the study are defined in 
the introduction to make room for analytical generalizations. In addition, the empirical data 
gathered is constantly matched with the literature framework. These measures allow for a 
higher level of external validity.  
 
Furthermore, to ensure reliability, a number of techniques are used, e.g., assuring similarity 
between the study’s problem and the study design; rigorously recording all empirical data and 
traces; establishing a case study database as well as a protocol; using the same theoretical lens 
across all sources of data, and by using methods of peer review during the study’s process. 
According to Riege (2003), by taking these quality measurements into account, it can provide 
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a case study with good scientific quality. In addition to this, by letting the respondents choose 
if they want to participate, ensure them that there are no right or wrong answers to the 
interview questions and offer them complete anonymity is a good way to ensure that the 
empirical observations are credible (Shenton. 2004). According to Shenton (2004), the 
qualitative investigator’s equivalent concept, i.e., credibility, deals with the question, “How 
congruent are the findings with reality?”  Although there are ways to find out how much 
trustworthiness the research has. Trustworthiness is a term used within interpretive and 
constructivist paradigms that is the approximate equivalent of validity. The trustworthiness of 
evaluation resides primarily within the data and is addressed by questions such as, “Are data 
able to be traced back to a primary source?” “Are they verifiable?” “Are the conclusions 
reached logical, sensible, and plausible?”  
 
Table 2. Methods and activities for establishing reliability and validity in case studies (based on Riege, 2003:78-
79; own modification). 
Case study 
design 
Examples of relevant activities Applied in this project 
Construct 
validity 
Use several sources during data 
collection  
Different respondents have been interviewed to 
get broader perspectives 
Establish course of action in data 
collection process 
Secondary data is reported and documented and 
interviews with respondents are transcribed 
Third-party review of evidence  Interviews are transcribed and sent to respondent 
for validation. 
Internal 
validity 
Use diagrams and illustrations in data 
analysis to assist explanation  
Models from literature review and theoretical 
framework is used for analysis 
Ensure that theoretical perspectives and 
findings are systematically related 
Same frameworks are used consistently 
throughout analysis of data 
External 
validity 
Define scope and boundaries in 
research design  
The delimitations of the study is defined in a part 
of the introduction 
Compare evidence with existing 
literature in data analysis 
Inductive research approach is used and analysis 
build on theoretical framework, a broader 
comparison is done in 7.4 
Reliability Give full account of used theories  Accomplished 
Assure congruence between the 
research issues and features of the study 
design  
Done in Chapter 5 
Record observations and actions as 
concrete as possible 
Interviews are recorded and observations were 
written down during each interview 
Use case study protocol See appendix 1 
Record data mechanically Interviews with respondents are recorded 
Develop case study database Structured collected data from respondents 
Assure meaningful parallelism of 
findings across multiple data sources 
Same framework/logic used in all interviews and 
documents 
Use peer review/examination Seminars with supervisor and opponents, 
opposition during presentation. 
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3.6 Ethical considerations 
 
When conducting studies, a number of ethical considerations need to be addressed. One way 
to regard these aspects is to reflect upon four key areas; informed consent for respondents, 
confidentiality, assessing consequences and the role of the researcher (Kvale & Brinkmann, 
2009). In this study, the respondents were informed about the study and its aim before given 
an invitation for participation in the form of an introduction letter and a summarized interview 
guide. The respondents were also informed that they are allowed to discontinue the interview 
at any time and that there would be a chance to validate the transcribed interview a time after 
it was done. In the study, the respondents from the producer organization and local 
associations have been identified with a random numeric number for the reason of 
confidentiality. The authors have considered the tradeoff for using anonymity as it might 
reduce the context, which is important in qualitative research and its generated findings 
(Robson, 2011). 
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4 Empirical data 
 
This chapter structures the empirics of the study. To give the readers a better understanding 
of the empirical data a short description of the collaborating structures and participants are 
presented. After that the empirical data generated from the interviews are presented and 
structured according to the theoretical framework. 
4.1 Description of collaborating structures 
 
This study uses empirical data from two different cases of collaboration, namely producer 
organizations and local associations. From each producer organization, two collaborating 
partners have been interviewed separately to give a deeper and wider understanding of the 
organization. The local associations have their boards, so to get the different perspectives 
fully explored by an individual who is a board member and a farmer have been interviewed. 
To extend the understanding of the association, the CEO was interviewed as well. The 
respondents are anonymous in the study and will be referred to, using individual abbreviations 
found in the two first tables below.  
 
Table 3. Presentation of respondents from producer organizations (own rendering). 
Respondent Production Structure 
P1a Grain Trading company 
P1b Grain Trading company 
P2a Pigs, grain Informal organization 
P2b Grain Informal organization 
P3a Grain Informal organization 
P3b Grain, cattle Informal organization 
P4a Grain Limited company 
P4b Grain Limited company 
 
Producer organization 1 (P1) 
Producer organization 1 is a trading company with seven owners. The organization is not a 
member in Lantmännen, but all of the farmers that own it are directly connected members in 
Lantmännen EK at an individual level. Within the organization, the members collaborate with 
staff, machinery, and trade. Currently, the organization does not enter new members. The 
organization is based in Närke.  
 
Producer organization 2 (P2) 
Producer organization 2 is an informal producer organization with three members. All the 
members of the organization are directly connected to Lantmännen EK on an individual level. 
The collaboration primarily acts through joint purchases of production factors and grain sales 
but also shares some fertilizer and feed between them. The organization is located in Uppland. 
 
Producer organization 3 (P3) 
Producer organization 3 is an informal producer organization with 12 members. The 
organization is relatively young and are today mainly focusing on trading with production 
factors but aims to collaborate in grain trade in the future. The organization is based in 
Västmanland.  
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Producer organization 4 (P4) 
Producer organization 4 is today a limited company with four owners but started out as an 
informal producer organization with 14 members. The company is a member and whole 
customer at Lantmännen. Within the company, owners collaborate with staff, machinery, 
grain storage (4000 tons) and trade. The company also support other neighboring farmers with 
storage and trade. The company is located in Östergötland. 
  
Table 4. Presentation of respondents from local associations (own rendering). 
Respondent Position Business areas 
L1a Board member/farmer Grain, Potato 
L1b CEO Trade, Grain storage, Store 
L1a Board member/farmer Grain 
L1b CEO Trade, Grain storage, Store 
L1a Board member/farmer Grain 
L1b CEO Trade, Grain storage, Store 
L1a Board member/farmer Grain 
L1b CEO Trade, Grain storage, Store 
 
Local association 1 (L1) 
Local association 1 is an economic association with >200 members where 2/3 operate active 
agricultural businesses. The association is a member and whole customer at Lantmännen. The 
association also has a store with a connected warehouse and employ >10 store employees and 
two sales representatives. It also owns a grain storage facility and handles around 50 000 ton 
grain yearly. To be a part of the association, a member has to be an active farmer and provide 
a capital investment of minimum 5000 SEK. The association is based in Skåne. 
 
Local association 2 (L2) 
Local association 2 is an economic association with 100 to 200 members where 1/10 is full-
time farmers. They are also whole customers at Lantmännen. The association also owns a 
store connected to a warehouse, but no grain storage facility. The association is based in 
Halland.  
 
Local association 3 (L3) 
Local association 3 is an economic association with 100 to 200 members where half of them 
operate active agricultural businesses. The association is a member at Lantmännen but is not a 
whole customer and does therefore not use the Lantmännen logo. They have a small store 
with seven employees and owns a grain storage facility. The association is based in Skåne.  
 
Local association 4 (L4) 
Local association 4 is an economic association with 100 to 200 where 1/3 have active 
agricultural businesses. The association is a member and whole customer at Lantmännen. The 
association is largely depending on their store operation. The association is based in Halland. 
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4.2 Results 
 
4.2.1 Financial drivers 
 
In the following Tables 5 and 6, the respondents’ discussed financial drivers are summarized. 
 
Table 5. Presentation of financial drivers recognized by producer organizations (own rendering). 
Collaboration Economy of scale Financial aspects Synergy effects 
P1 Additional profit, A 
greater bargaining power 
is perceived 
Incentives for 
investments, quality and 
timing 
Collaboration through 
machines, staff and 
internal trade 
P2 Lowering costs, A 
greater bargaining power 
is perceived 
Longer deadlines for 
credits 
Collaboration through 
internal trade 
P3 Lowering costs, A 
greater bargaining power 
is perceived 
Longer deadlines for 
credits, able to receive 
more offers 
Collaboration through 
internal trade 
P4 Additional profit, A 
greater bargaining power 
is perceived 
Farm and sell together, 
Whole customers in 
Lantmännen 
Own machinery and 
storage jointly, working 
for the company 
 
Every producer organization expresses that the drive to join together and collaborate was to 
get a better price position on input and grain. This is done by both buying and selling as a 
unified actor and in that way achieve greater batches. All of the four organizations experience 
that the collaborations have lead to, more or less, better prices. The willingness to tell how 
significant the price differences is, oppose to trade on your own, varies between respondents, 
but P3a and P3b mention a 15% price decrease on production factors. P2a have noticed a 
greater marketing power through a greater number of offers. Meanwhile, there is a firm belief 
that there is more money to earn by selling grain together compared to buying production 
factors. One of the reasons behind this, according to P4a, is that bigger batches of grain 
provide an opportunity for the producers to sell without paying for transportation, which in 
turn allows for larger margins on grain sold. P4a and P4b explain that they also are whole 
customers in Lantmännen, which means that they receive a financial kickback on grain sold to 
Lantmännen EA. However, P1a and P1b express that there is a limit to what you can achieve 
with greater volume when it comes to margins on trade. Therefore, in their case, they are not 
aiming to grow as an organization but instead improve product and business quality. P1a say 
that to be an interesting player on the Swedish grain market; you need to reach volumes of 
10,000 tonnes yearly. None of neither P4a nor P4b recognize any limit that P1a and P1b are 
talking about, on the contrary. P4b want to get more farmers to join the collaboration. In order 
to make it easy for farmers to buy in and join the P4s collaboration, P4a and P4b mention that 
they decided early on to lend money to machinery and facilities in order not to build up a 
huge amount of capital.  
 
All of the respondents, P2a, P2b, P3a and P3b, bring up credit periods as another beneficial 
aspect of the collaboration. They were able to negotiate better credit terms due to major deals. 
Meanwhile, P4a and P4b talk about the rational operation generated through the collaboration 
as the main driving force. P1b further states the importance of being able to store the grain 
and sell at the right time to be able to achieve a better price on grain. P1b is experiencing that 
the collaboration has led to expanding investments in the individual agricultural operation.  
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P4a also touches on the subject and believes that the collaboration has made them able to be 
an early adopter of new technology and machinery. P1b mentions further that the 
collaboration has led to the individual farms becoming more homogeneous, similar in size and 
approaches. P3a and P3b mention that they strive for the kind of development P1b is talking 
about, to be able to achieve their goals with common grain trade in the future. All of the 
respondents, P1a, P1b, P2a, P2b, P3a, and P3b, state that they have, as a starting point that 
they will choose to trade with the best performing actor in terms of price. P4 is, as stated 
earlier, whole costumer in Lantmännen EA and P4a and P4b explains that they are located 
near Lantmännen ethanol factory, which means they trade mainly with Lantmännen EA. In all 
four cases, there is internal trade when needed.  
 
The formation has also given life to other forms of collaboration between collaborators. P1a 
and P1b mention that they have a machinery collaboration with each other. They also use the 
organization as a platform to trade with other collaborators. This is mainly in the form of 
fertilizer, feed, and seed. P2 does not have internal trade to the same extent based on what 
they tell about their business. However, both P2a and P2b mention trade in the form of 
manure, straw, and feed. P3a and P3b state that they use internal trade to balance the storages 
of input between collaborators. P4a and P4b state that they have a close collaboration on 
several areas, including trade. They run their operation as one unit, they farm, and own 
machinery together. 
 
Table 6. Presentation of financial drivers recognized by local associations (own rendering). 
Association Economy of scale Financial aspects Synergy effects 
L1 Additional revenue Intermediary, kick back, 
credits 
Closeness, service and 
flexibility 
L2 Additional revenue, 
bargaining power 
Intermediary, kick back, 
market influencer credits 
Closeness, service and 
flexibility 
L3 Additional revenue, 
bargaining power 
Intermediary, credits Closeness, service and 
flexibility 
L4 Additional revenue, 
bargaining power 
Collective contract, Kick 
back, credits 
Closeness, service and 
flexibility 
 
Every local association mentions that the greatest economic driver comes from collectively 
making purchases and selling grain to gain both bargaining and market power. By buying 
input in larger batches prices can be reduced, and by handling a greater quantity of grain the 
prices can be somewhat raised. Handling and logistic costs can be lowered. L4b explains that 
they sign a pool price contract with Lantmännen EA early on every year. The pool price 
means that the price for grain delivered to Lantmännen EA from the local association is based 
on the average grain price over a certain period. In this way, the association takes the risk 
while members can deliver to the local association to the pooled price without having to tie up 
time for negotiation themselves. By signing this type of contract early on with Lantmännen 
EA, they get a price premium of 30 SEK per tonne delivered. 20 of 30 SEK is directly added 
to the grain price they pay their members, and 10 SEK is kept within the association. L2a and 
L2b mention that when the member signs a forward contract with the association they, in turn, 
sign an equivalent contract with Lantmännen EA not to risk more than the individual 
members do. Hence, the volatility of the grain market and gambling with risk could 
potentially ruin the associations’ finances. L2a and L2b together with L1a, L1b, L4a, and L4b 
explain the advantages of collective trade through the association when they are whole 
customers in Lantmännen EA. Hence, they obtain a significant kick back, from gain sales to 
Lantmännen EA based on the volume of the batches. They believe that this provides an 
additional incentive to trade with Lantmännen EA 
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L3b mentions that they are located in a region with a lot of competition. Hence, the 
association has attempted to diversify itself through biogas and rapeseed methyl ester, to be 
able to provide better profitability. However, the efforts have not been successful. 
Nevertheless, L3b sees strength in being just an intermediary because that allows them to sell 
to whomever they want and because they are not a whole customer in the Lantmännen EA, 
they can buy from whomever they want. There is also a feeling of service and closeness 
connected to the associations by its members, as stated by L1a, L1b, L4a, and L4b. Because 
of the fact that the associations are smaller than Lantmännen EA, L1b, and L4b perceive that 
they know the needs of their customers and may be more flexible and available. L2a, L2b, 
L3a, and L3b joins in on these appreciated values regarding flexibility and quick decisions.  
 
All of the respondents, L1a, L1b, L2a, L2b, L4a and L4b, stress the importance of members 
promoting the associations’ own store. L1a sees the cost of an intermediary actor in the trade 
relationship as an essential aspect and states that the increased margins are important for these 
costs not contributing to a net loss for the members. L2a and L2b also touch on the subject by 
mentioning that the revenue from the store covers the costs of their business organization and 
employees. It is vital for the incentives that the association does not let the members cover the 
administrative costs. L4b explains that they aim to be the number one store in the region 
regarding materials and supplies for gardening and household. 
 
The local associations are economic associations and therefore, in many cases, strive to have a 
similar structure as Lantmännen EA. This is often evident through the bylaws, and the way 
dividends are distributed between members. To motivate members to trade through the local 
associations, the boards often have a higher refund and supplementary payments than 
Lantmännen EA. L1b states that they always aim to have half of a percent higher than 
Lantmännen EA. L2 have around one percent higher, L3 have the same as Lantmännen EA.  
L4b states that they have a refund that exceeds Lantmännen EA by around six percentage. All 
of the local associations percieve this as one of the greatest drivers for members. Most of the 
associations handle refunds and supplementary payments the way Lantmännen EA does, by 
paying the members after basing it on the annual report. However, none of the local 
associations uses contribution issue the way that Lantmännen EK does.  
 
L2b mentions the ability to be able to drive up the prices for other competitors when the 
competitors can offer prices that cannot be matched in the market. Local mills have shorter 
transport distances and can, therefore, offer a higher price on grain. However, if the 
association did not set their prices for the grain, the mills could go even lower. This translates 
into a member benefit and a financial driver.  
 
The associations also see the way they handle credits as a driver for members to be a part and 
trade through the association. As the local associations are more flexible with credits due to 
good relations with its members, they are able to adapt to situations if a client has a hard time 
making a payment one month. L2b states that the association can be seen as an “economic 
rubber band.” L1a and L1b further argue the advantages of the membership because the 
association has credits with low-interest rates, which gives the farmers even more incentives. 
L3b believes that, as a local association, they can offer longer credit times than other actors in 
their area. 
 
Synergy effects have also been noted, where members from the same local association may 
start other types of collaborations on farm level. L2a and L2b mention that trade with 
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production factors between members exist, with the association as an intermediator. This is a 
tool that helps manage and balance the storages between farms where someone might have 
bought too much and someone too little. L1a expressed that different farm-to-farm 
collaborations have been formed by members in the local association in the areas of machine-
sharing and feed trading. Some of the respondents’ mention that sub-groups have formed 
among the members of the associations to, in their turn, achieve higher quantities and try to 
get better prices. The managers of said local association often oppose this behavior, arguing 
that it does not belong in an economic association. L1b, L2a, L2b and L4b all mention, some 
in connection to this, that the cooperative feeling among members often overshadows the 
financial aspects and lead to, members choosing to trade through the association either way.   
 
4.2.2 Social drivers 
 
In the following Tables 7 and 8, the respondents’ discussed social drivers are summarized. 
 
Table 7. Presentation of social drivers recognized by producer organizations (own rendering). 
Collaboration Prior social 
capital 
Beneficial 
relationships 
Exchange of 
expertise and 
knowledge 
Decision 
process 
Social structure 
P1 Small groups 
with strong ties 
joined together 
to one 
organisation 
Different 
competencies 
and areas of 
responsibility 
Internal 
transparency, 
exchange of 
experiences and 
competence 
Two-person 
decisions, 
unbound 
participation, 
transparency 
Strong social 
bonds, safety 
P2 Neighbours and 
friends, strong 
ties. 
Set areas of 
responsibility 
can gives a 
greater focus 
Exchange of 
business 
information and 
market 
opportunities 
Two-person 
decisions, 
unbound 
participation, 
transparency 
Business, 
strong social 
bonds 
P3 Direct ties, 
indirect ties 
Different 
competencies 
Exchange of 
business 
information and 
market 
opportunities 
Joint decision 
 
Business, wider 
and closer 
network 
P4 Friend from 
school, strong 
ties. Indirect 
ties.   
Joint operation Internal 
transparency, 
exchange of 
experiences and 
competence 
Joint decision 
 
Function as a 
unit 
 
All respondents representing the producer organizations perceive that the collaboration has 
led to stronger social ties with the involved farmers. It varies slightly how well the farmers 
knew each other before the collaboration began, some went to school together, others were 
friends since before. Some are related to each other, and in some cases, farmers did not fully 
know all who would become a part of the collaboration. However, in most cases, partners 
know everyone through someone else, i.e., through a third person. In P3, not everyone knew 
each other before the collaboration started. However, farmer P3a highlights that, although the 
members still are getting to know each other, the organization has contributed to a wider and 
closer network. This indicates that with the collaboration structure in place people are starting 
to get to know each other.  
 
Common field walks and production related activities are something all producer 
organizations arrange regularly. Farmer P1a mentions that within their group they do many 
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activities together. One example that he highlights is traveling, which is financed by 
depositing 1 percent of all earnings from trade through the producer organization.  
 
Most of the producer organizations have no written contract or bylaws governing the 
collaboration. Farmer P1a and P1b accentuate that if a contract between the collaborating 
farmers where needed the collaboration would never work out. The exception from this is P4, 
where farmer P4a and P4b explains that since the organization is a limited company, it 
requires a shareholder’s agreement and statutes, which regulates entry and exit as well as 
what information may be said outward.    
 
The fact that collaboration, through respectively producer organization, contributes to an 
increase in exchange of information is something that all respondents agree on. P4a 
emphasize how the climate regarding information exchange has changed by being a part of 
the organization. Before the collaboration, farmer P4a perceived that there was a reason to 
keep a lot of information secret to other farmers, but today there is full transparency between 
the farmers he is collaborating with. Full transparency is something the farmers P1a and P1b 
also acknowledge in their producer organization. One of the respondents from P1, farmer P1b, 
felt the most valuable information exchange to be about business information and business 
opportunities, e.g., information regarding buying new machinery and business loans. 
Moreover, farmer P2a, P2b, P3a, and P3b agrees with this but consider information regarding 
the status of each member’s production and production advice to be a helpful and important 
part of the exchange within the collaboration as well.   
 
Farmer P1a and P1b state that one of the driving powers of the collaboration is the increased 
exchange of experiences and competence within the group. In their collaboration, the 
members represent quite varying experiences outside the agricultural sector, which can 
enhance learning. The farmers representing P1 also mention, in connection to this, that each 
member has individual responsibility areas within the organization. Farmer A representing P3 
mentions that they have a similar layout but points out that this structure implies that some 
members do more than others. P1a and P1b are talking about similar issues that have been 
solved by giving those who work more with the organization than others do, the ability to bill 
the organization. 
 
Both respondents in P1 and P4 emphasizes on the feeling of security and community as one of 
the major driving factors behind continued collaboration. Farmer P1a states that if he would 
to be injured in any way or ill, he trusts that a fellow collaborator would step in and help. 
Farmer P4a brings up their concept of weekly breakfast meetings where all collaborators 
assemble and decide what work the following week will consist of and how they could assist 
each other.  
 
Farmer P4b recognizes that there exist some difficulties in running a producer organization. 
The respondent further explains that everybody does not always think alike and agree with 
each other. This is to some extent depending on what experience and knowledge each one 
possesses. Farmer P3a agrees with this and points out that sometimes it can be difficult to 
reach other members with own thoughts and ideas due to diversity.  
 
When it comes to prior social capital among members of local associations, all of the 
respondents describe the long history of each association. L3b mentions that many of their 
members have been involved over generations, and this is the case when talking to L1, L2, 
and L4 as well. However, L4b mentioned during the interview, that the association just 
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received a new member that never been a member of the association before, but he knows 
farmers that were and had been. 
 
Table 8. Presentation of social drivers recognized by local associations (own rendering). 
Association Prior social 
capital 
Beneficial 
relationships 
Exchange of 
expertise and 
knowledge 
Decisions 
process, 
influence 
Social structure 
L1 Long history Service, 
Flexibility  
Yes Board of 
directors and 
annual meeting  
Network, 
Social bonds, 
Cooperative 
feeling 
L2 Long history Service, 
Flexibility 
Yes Board of 
directors and 
annual meeting 
Network, 
Social bonds, 
Cooperative 
feeling 
L3 Long history Service, 
Flexibility 
Yes Board of 
directors and 
annual meeting 
Social bonds, 
Safety, 
Community 
L4 Long history Service, 
Flexibility 
Yes Board of 
directors and 
annual meeting 
Safety, Social 
bonds, 
Cooperative 
feeling 
 
All of the associations state that the social aspect of the collaboration for the continued 
support and involvement of the members is important. Some local associations mention that 
the membership adds to a feeling of being part of a group or a strong feeling of ownership, 
which may add to the sense of security and social interaction. L1b brings up the perceived 
security when trading and handling problems through a local association as a driver for 
further membership. 
 
The associations and its premises may act as an active social forum for the members to meet 
each other during the year. L1a mentions that the association has a store where members go 
shopping products for their business operation. The store also acts as a meeting point for 
members during the year they also serve breakfast every morning for active members. 
 
L2b emphasizes the value of well-functioning network between the members and their role as 
a knowledge provider. L2a mentions that the strong network between the association and 
members is used to spread knowledge about technology and input.  L3a talks about that they 
have an activity called “experience groups” where younger farmers are able to share 
competence and experience among themselves as well as get expertise from external advisors. 
This contributes with support and safety for relatively new farmers and members.  
All of the associations also host different events, which mostly focus on expanding 
knowledge in a certain field or is just pure entertainment for members. L1a describes that they 
have a wide variety of events. One of them is a summer party where the members have shown 
increasing interest during the last ten years. L1a views the attendance of the summer party as 
an important key measurement of the degree of member satisfaction; customer satisfaction is 
also measured in the store. They also host a Christmas evening, field walks, member meetings 
and study trips around Europe. L2a and L2b mention that their measure of member 
satisfaction is to view the total attendance at the annual meeting. L3a and L3b see their events 
as a clear member benefit and do many different activities. Every year they arrange a dance in 
connection with the annual meeting, they also host morning meetings, a yearly kick-off, and 
several field walks. L4a and L4b describe a similar social structure with meetings, joint 
activities and study trips along with L2.  
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None of the associations have written social goals stated, but they all mention the importance 
of social interaction. L1b states that the social aspect is critical, but the main focus has to be 
around production and profitability to be able to sustain it.  Most of the associations’ mentions 
that the members have the chance to influence on large subjects at the annual meeting. 
Nevertheless, they also emphasize that the management always is open for suggestions and 
concerns of the members. 
 
4.2.3 Trust 
 
In the following Tables 9 and 10, the respondents’ discussed trust between collaborators are 
summarized. 
 
Table 9. Presentation of trust between collaborators in producer organizations (own rendering). 
Collaboration Information sharing Mutuality Openness Membership 
requirements 
P1 Shared frequently, 
distributed to 
everyone in the 
collaboration 
Even Honest and 
contemporary 
information 
encouraged to 
admit flaws 
No contracts 
P2 All business 
information 
regarding 
collaboration is 
quickly distributed 
Even Honest and 
contemporary 
information, details 
about the 
production 
No contracts 
P3 All business 
information 
regarding 
collaboration is 
quickly distributed 
Even Honest and 
contemporary 
information, details 
about the 
production  
No contracts 
P4 Shared frequently, 
distributed to all 
collaborators 
Even Honest and 
contemporary 
information 
Contracts 
 
Different kind of techniques for information sharing have been identified among the group of 
producer organizations. P1a mentions that text messages and email are key information 
channels. The communication with these tools is also frequently updating all the collaborators 
on different matters, such as prices on sales and purchases. P2a states that the information 
exchange usually through the mobile phone. The collaborators are also neighbours, which 
give them the possibility to meet face-to-face in many situations. P3a also uses email and 
regular meetings to make decisions. P4a mentions that the information sharing has improved 
significantly in his mind since the formation of the collaboration. Everything is open and 
transparent in terms of information between the farmers, something that was not obvious 
when they were operating on their own. 
 
The mutuality between collaborators is often perceived as relatively even among partners in 
the producer organizations. P1a and P1b argue that the collaborators benefit from their 
structure both financially and socially and views it as vital for the continual collaboration 
existence. P2a mentions that although different actors may benefit differently on the 
collaboration, it still results in a net gain for everyone. Furthermore, P2b 1a mentioned the 
importance of not feeling jealousy towards the other actors if the benefits aren’t precisely 
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distributed equally. If that is the case, then the collaboration is more difficult to sustain. P3a 
expresses that all of the collaborators benefit from the organization but that a few individuals 
are not at a satisfying level of participation. P4a states that everyone is benefiting from the 
organization and the increase in market power. 
 
Openness is an important factor to the producer organizations. P1a reveals that their structure 
allows for open communications, both in terms of goals and ambitions of individual actors but 
also in shortcomings during the years. P1b expresses as critical for the stability and 
maintenance of the collaboration. Furthermore, P1a also states that it is a great way to connect 
and increase trust and mutuality in the collaboration. P1b also points out that openness and 
transparency are important in the business relation and trade towards other actors as well for 
trust to increase. P1a also mentions that openness is perceived as important and that the 
collaborators have known each other for a long time and therefore find it easy to 
communicate satisfyingly with each other. P3b mentions that they are wholly transparent with 
the pricing of the individual farmers. It is of course important that every collaborator in the 
same organization has information about the business. The need for openness is something 
that P4a further emphasizes with his response. 
 
None of the collaborations except P4 have contracts for their collaborative structures and 
solely depends of social bonds and trust. However, P4 uses contracts as their structure is a 
limited company with shares, according to P4a this makes the relationship more prone to need 
a contractual obligation.  
 
Table 10. Presentation of trust between members by local association (own rendering). 
Association Information sharing Mutuality Openness Membership 
requirements 
L1 Financial situation, 
opportunities 
Even Close to decisions Active agricultural 
business, minimum 
contribution capital 
of 5000 SEK 
L2 Financial situation, 
opportunities 
Even Close to decisions, 
transparent pricing 
Active agricultural 
business, minimum 
contribution capital 
of 10000 SEK 
L3 Financial situation, 
opportunities 
Even Close to decisions Active agricultural 
business, minimum 
contribution capital 
of 10000 SEK 
L4 Financial situation, 
opportunities 
Even Transparent pricing Active agricultural 
business, no 
contribution capital 
 
The information sharing is often done through email and text messages from the local 
association. All of the respondents mention that the information shared often is about price 
campaigns and other types of financial deals that the members can take part in. 
 
All of the local associations believe that their members obtain benefits by being members of 
the association. However, L1a, L1b, L2a and L2b mention that a few large members might 
get better deals by being on their own. Although it is highlighted that those deals might not 
yield a significant financial gain and that those members still have a social aspect to gain from 
being a member. Another point mentioned by the associations is the closeness and services 
available, making the business relationship more flexible. L3a provides an example where 
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they were able to offer a good deal on malting barley to its members. These contracts were 
mainly given to the members who had bought malting barley seed from the association and 
therefore award them for the loyalty in the business relationship with the association. L3a also 
views the continued existence of the local association as a result of mutual benefits. If 
members or management didn’t perceive the benefits of the association's future existence, 
then it would quickly fall out of favor. L4a expresses that their members are loyal to the 
association. It is perceived that the average member doesn’t haggle and searches for better 
prices but instead expects a good refund supplementary payment and knows that it will be one 
of the more attractive alternatives in the market. However, the management expresses a risk 
with its members expecting high returns as they may be lower some years into the future.  
 
L1a is doing a lot to be as transparent as possible and therefore increases the openness. The 
association uses different discount levels depending on how effectively members are able to 
fill transports but other than that there is no difference regarding the business relationship. 
Most of the local associations express a risk of being too transparent though, since prices may 
easily be matched by competing IOFs. One of them being L2a who tries to keep the pricing 
model to each and every member and not share the information to the same extent. However, 
L2b also states that if the prices become too “discriminatory” against small members, it will 
be a threat to the legitimacy of the economic association. L3a states that there are different 
segments of their member base with different attitudes concerning information sharing and 
pricing. Which, concerning trust, makes it vital to motivate the business relation and price to 
each member. L3b mentions that the greatest value is how well members can embrace the 
financial aspects and development of the association and their ability to participate and 
influence on this basis. L4a is also keen on motivating the business deal and are transparent 
when members ask about prices. However, they express a perceived risk to offer public price 
information as other actors with the information may try to take advantage of this 
information. L4a also mention that they do not offer any price differences between members. 
 
The requirements of the membership vary between the association. Most of them require that 
the member must operate a business connected to the agricultural sector but does not 
necessarily need to be a farm, although the majority are. L1 and L2 also have a minimum 
investment of capital of 5000 SEK respectively 10000 SEK that has to be paid within 5 years. 
L1b mentions that they do not want too big members as it might risk the entire association's 
financial stability and they might demand special treatment. L3 and L4 do not require a 
minimum investment attached to the membership. 
4.2.4 Trust towards cooperative 
 
In the following Tables 11 and 12, the respondents’ discussed trust towards cooperative are 
summarized. 
 
The general perception varies between the different producer organizations when it comes to 
Lantmännen EK. P1a views Lantmännen as a very well operated business but say that they 
don’t contribute to sufficient member benefit in terms of member prices P1b shares the 
thought of Lantmännen being a well-run operation, but that also creates internal costs given 
its growth. P2a has a positive view of Lantmännen but also expresses that they are so big that 
it is very difficult to make your voice heard in an organization of this size and complexity. 
P2a argues that the organization faces difficulties pleasing all its member's interests and 
ambitions. P3a thinks that Lantmännen can be regarded as too big and expensive and be too 
far away from the owners. P4a expresses a favourable opinion of Lantmännen. However, they 
also mention the anomaly of operating a smaller cooperative within Lantmännen EK. 
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Table 11. Presentation of trust by producer organizations (own rendering). 
Collaboration General perception Perception of business 
activities 
Board of directors and 
regional representatives 
P1 Well run business, fail to 
recognize the member 
benefit 
Need to focus more on 
primary production 
Low trust 
P2 Positive perception, hard 
for individuals to make 
change 
Positive perception High trust 
P3 Far away from its 
owners, costly 
Positive perception Low trust 
P4 Good perception, 
questions the need of PO 
Positive perception High trust 
 
The perception of Lantmännens various business activities also varies among the producer 
organizations. P1b questions that Lantmännens international commitments and wonders if the 
activities shouldn’t all be tied to Sweden. P1a perceives them as a benefice from a business 
perspective but that they don’t provide enough benefits to the members. P2a expresses a 
positive view of the business activities and the revenue they create to Lantmännen EK. 
Regarding business activities, P3a expresses that the activities are positive and endorses their 
initiatives in the market. P4a thinks that the business activities have just grown to be better 
and better during the years.  
 
P2a has a positive attitude towards the regional representatives and board based on own 
experiences. P3a do not perceive that Lantmännen does its utmost to benefit the members, 
P3a argues that the profit development should have been higher over the years. P3b also state 
states that the trust towards elected representatives and the board is overall low. P4a, on the 
contrary, states that the trust towards elected representatives and the board is high. 
 
Table 12. Presentation of members by local associations (own rendering). 
Association General perception Perception of business 
activities 
Board of directors and 
regional representatives 
L1 Positive attitude towards 
LM during recent years 
Positive, perceives coop 
as market leading and 
provides high dividends 
Members’ best interest, 
lack of interest of local 
associations 
L2 Positive attitude towards 
LM during recent years 
Positive, more resilient Lack of understanding, 
individual agendas 
L3 Positive attitude towards 
LM during recent years 
Positive, market leading High trust 
L4 Positive attitude towards 
LM during recent years 
Positive High trust 
 
The general perception of Lantmännen EK is favorable as of today. Many of the associations 
feel great respect for them and for being a part of them. It is also viewed as a very well run 
business that is easy to trade with. However, this has not always been the case since when the 
fusion of Lantmännen occurred the general opinion was that the local associations should join 
into Lantmännen EK too. This created some conflicts between the two parts. L3a and L3b 
mention that they have a positive view of the management today but that most of the previous 
board also is changed.  L1a expresses a good opinion about Lantmännen today, but they also 
bring up a more troubled time directly after the business fusion in 2000 as an all-time low. 
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L4a enhances the idea of good relationship with Lantmännen and highlights the good returns 
on trade. 
The perception of the business activities that Lantmännen operates is generally positive. 
Every local association feels that the extended business activities add value to the cooperative 
and, by extension, its members. L1a views them as a great way to achieve higher results in the 
organization and a way to become more stable and resilient to the global market. L2b sees the 
resulting dividends as a good measure of the economic activities all members benefit from. 
L2a also believe that the efforts put in said activities help Lantmännen EK to become an 
influencer on the market in terms of innovation and ways of trade. L4a expresses that they are 
positive toward the current activities that Lantmännen EK pursues, stating that if Lantmännen 
would not do it no one else would. They also feel that Lantmännen is leading the grain and 
food market today. L4a also expresses a positive attitude towards Lantmännens business 
activity. 
 
In general, the associations have a good opinion and trusts that the board of representatives 
and regional representatives are handling the members’ interests. L2a did not have an opinion 
of the board of directors and regional representatives. L2b thinks that the board of directors 
has the members’ best interest in mind but that they might not care about the local 
associations. L1a perceives that regional representatives may not always look to the 
cooperative as a whole but might instead have individual agendas. L1a also expresses that the 
board of directors lack interest in local associations. L4a and L3a trusts both regional 
representatives and the board of directors to guard the interests. 
 
4.2.5 Loyalty 
 
In Tables 13 and 14, below, the respondents’ discussed loyalty is summarized. 
 
The perception of Lantmännen as a reliable and secure market partner and an assured market 
channel is shared among the producer organizations. The business orientation differs between 
the producer organizations and the collaborators active in them. P1a tells us that they always 
check offers from various actors before buying and selling products. P1b also mentions the 
willingness to prefer IOFs in front of Lantmännen EK because of market reasons. P2a trade 
through Lantmännen in most cases today, because of the good prices. P3a also asks for offers 
from various actors but does in most cases trade with Lantmännen and expresses a willingness 
to do so because of being members of the association. P4a states that their collaboration is a 
whole customer at Lantmännen and therefore does more than 80% of their input purchases at 
the cooperative. The respondent also expresses the willingness to support his “cooperative 
heart”. However, they do ask for offers from other actors to keep business relations going and 
in some cases they also choose to trade with IOFs if the price is more beneficial. 
 
Regarding cooperative ideology both the respondents of P1 have been actively trading with 
other actors to encourage competition of the grain market. Both also think of Lantmännen as a 
cooperative without the core member benefits for a framer. P2a doesn’t express any special 
feelings for the cooperative either and is more focused on good prices. However, both P3 and 
P4 express that they have a very strong cooperative ideology and want to trade with the 
organization they are a part of. P3a also perceives that the member benefit is fading. 
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Table 13. Presentation of loyalty by producer organizations (own rendering). 
Collaboration Assured market Business 
orientation 
Cooperative 
ideology 
Frequency of trade 
P1 Yes Unsatisfied with 
structure, would 
like an allocation 
to higher grain 
prices 
No Low  
P2 Yes Is satisfied with 
pricing today, 
perceives that LM 
was slow to adapt 
to competition 
earlier 
No High 
P3 Yes Unsatisfied with 
structure, would 
like an allocation 
to higher grain 
prices 
Yes High 
P4 Yes Is whole customer 
in LM and trades 
at least 80% of 
input with LM 
Yes High 
 
The frequency of trade is also different between collaborations and from the empirical data; 
they seem to be connected to the previous answers from the respondents regarding business 
orientation. P1a mentions that they seek out other actors to ask for offers. P1a also mentions 
the lock-in on the market meaning that it is difficult to sell grain to independent customers 
and IOFs. The organization has not traded a lot with Lantmännen EK the latest years. 
However, the frequency has increased in the latest period because of the pricing situation. P2b 
states that they only trade with Lantmännen for the time being, something that has not always 
been the case. P3a states that they have a high frequency of trade with Lantmännen, both due 
of prices compared to other actors but also because of the feeling of ownership towards the 
cooperative. P4a also mentions that they have a high frequency of trade, which partly stems 
from being whole customer and the cooperative ideology of the respondent. 
 
Table 14. Presentation of loyalty by local associations (own rendering). 
Association Assured market Business orientation Cooperative 
ideology 
Frequency of 
trade 
L1 Yes Handles offers from 
multiple actors, 
contracts with LM 
regarding 80% input 
Yes High 
L2 Yes Handles offers from 
multiple actors, 
contracts with LM 
regarding 80% input 
Yes High 
L3 Yes Handles offers from 
multiple actors 
Yes/no High 
L4 Yes Only with LM, 
contracts with LM 
regarding 80% input 
Yes High 
 
Lantmännen being a reliable and assuring trading partner is something that all of the 
associations stated in the interviews. The relation with the cooperative is perceived as very 
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well handled, especially compared to the status of the relations at the beginning of the 2000’s. 
L1, L3 and L4 agree with these statements. L2a brought up Lantmännens willingness to 
always accept grain, even in the most intense periods. Meanwhile, smaller actors risk reaching 
their capacities. This might result in them not being able to handle additional grain. L2b 
shared that idea. However, a problem could arise where Lantmännens own sales 
representatives compete with the association's sales representatives on the local market. 
 
All of the local associations state that they mainly trade with the cooperative. Most of the 
associations have made a contract with Lantmännen and their trading relationship. The 
contract states that 80% of the agricultural wares must be Lantmännen-associated products. 
However, all of the local associations are trading intensely with Lantmännen because of the 
price and the high dividends compared to the rest of the market. L3a expresses that the rates 
of refunds and supplementary payments have been a great incentive for the association to 
mostly trade grain and input with Lantmännen EK. When it comes to the invested capital in 
Lantmännen L3b mentions that they have built up a substantial capital and that they cannot 
see where they could get a better dividend on its capital. 
 
The cooperative ideology is a central concept to the members, employees, and board of the 
local associations. L1 as well as L2 found the cooperative idea very compelling and as a 
viable business idea. L2a thought of it as a way for smaller actors to compete and get fair 
prices on markets and that the idea of cooperative structures benefits each actor. Examples of 
ICA were given where the ICA store owners buy most of the products from the ICA central 
storage, this gives ICA a greater bargaining power and proves that the cooperative idea works 
just as well outside the agriculture sector.  
 
Most of the local associations have a contract with Lantmännen today, to be able to have the 
word “Lantmän” in the association's name and to use their symbol 80% of the input must be 
bought from Lantmännen EK. L1a, L2a, and L4a provide information about quota contracts, 
L3a argues that they felt more flexible in their business relations but that almost all of their 
trade goes through Lantmännen today because it just makes more sense to amass the whole 
trade relation. All of the associations did trade most of their input and grain with Lantmännen 
Ek today though, as prices, dividends, and relations have been very good over the latest years. 
L2a mention that they sometimes trade with IOFs when price campaigns are issued or to keep 
business relations afloat. They ask for offers from most actors on the market to assure 
themselves that they recieve a fair market price for their products. L4a, on the other hand, 
never deals with any other actor and instead focus all their effort to Lantmännen and brings up 
the advantages with economic returns. 
 
Two of the local associations, L2 and L4, regardless of being whole customers in Lantmännen 
EK or not, say that they feel less bound to Lantmännen on the input side of the business 
relation. None of the associations has any sales quotas connected to Lantmännen EK 
regardless of being a full customer or not. L2a, L2b, and L3b mention the difficulty of selling 
directly to mills, feed factories and other processing plants as these actors often have contracts 
with larger grain actors. L3a, therefore, argues for the importance of having a good 
relationship with the major players Lantmännen and Svenska Foder. 
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5 Analysis and discussion 
The chapter connects the presented theoretical framework with the empirics gathered for the 
study. The analysis is sorted between collaboration and cooperative theory and will conclude 
with a discussion, which will compare the analysis with studies in the presented literature 
review. 
 
 
Figure 5. A combination of the empirical data and the theoretical framework for the thesis (Lambert et al., 1996; 
Fawcett et al., 2012; own modification) 
5.1 Collaboration 
 
5.1.1 Drivers for collaboration 
 
One important financial driver for actors to join into an agricultural collaboration is the aspect 
of better pricing and stronger positions to negotiate (Michelv and Vilalta-Perdomo, 2016; 
Fearne, A. 1998). All the respondents answer that the financial aspect is the primary driver for 
these collaborations to exist, both in the context of producer organizations and local 
associations. Some go as far as to say that the associations and organizations would be 
regarded as meaningless if better pricing was not able to be pursued.  
 
The respondent's experiences that collaboration through producer organizations allows for 
reduced operation costs in the form of lower prices on production means and rational 
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operation. It also provides greater margins on produced grain for collaborating farmer. 
Greater marketing power is perceived by the respondents through, more interested buyers and 
sellers due to larger volumes, this leads to better business conditions. A part of the 
respondents collaborate with machinery and grain storage and find it easier to invest in new 
technology due to greater use and, in some cases, joint financing. This is all well in line with 
Lambert et al. (1996) and Fearne, A. (1998) thoughts about financial drivers for collaborating.  
 
In the cases of the local associations, the respondents talk about similar financial drivers. 
However, the view of financial drivers is less business oriented and more based on creating 
membership benefits, e.g., L1 service and flexibility, L2 market influence, credits and 
flexibility and  L4 collective contracts. Nevertheless, this view of the financial driver also 
matches well with Lambert et al., (1996) theories of asset efficiency, cost efficiency and 
market advantages. Although, Michelv and Vilalta-Perdomo (2016) states in a study that 
farmer’s interest in participating in a collaboration, mainly depends on the advantages in 
terms of better prices and stronger positions to negotiate, this is not entirely true when it 
comes to local associations. Respondents from almost all of the associations interviewed in 
this study mention that the cooperative feeling among members is often stronger than the 
financial incentives. Here there is a difference compared to members in producer 
organizations, due to the fact that, despite an appreciation for the cooperative model they 
prefer financial incentives. However, Fearne, A. (1998) thoughts on cost sharing associated 
with the development of the business and new technology is well in line with the experience 
of both producer organizations and local associations. When it comes to local associations, 
additional financial drivers are highlighted through higher dividends than Lantmännen EA, 
higher grain prices due to kickback on sold grain and more flexible contracts. These 
additional drivers are based on large business volumes and economies of scale that exist due 
resource complementarity between firms that are members of the association. Hence, it fits 
well with theories by Richardson, (1972), Nohria and Garcia-Pont, (1991) on the subject.         
 
Social drivers are also an important aspect regarding collaborative formations between actors 
(Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992; Coleman, 1990; Gulati, 1995a). There is a variation between 
the producer organizations when it comes to the social capital before the formation of the 
respective organization. Today all the producer organizations exist of both partners with 
strong ties to each other and partners that once were more or less, strangers to each other. This 
is something that Chung et al., (2000) explains is the optimal strategy for alliance formation 
in the first of three categories regarding social capital as a driver, direct prior alliance 
experience.  But what can be noted is that most of them are founded by members with strong 
ties to each other which is well in line with Chung et al., (2000) second category, reciprocity 
in opportunity exchange. With time the producer organizations have added additional 
collaborators that may have been a stranger to some of the founders at first but been known 
indirectly through a third-party, someone inside or outside the organization. This is consistent 
with Chung et al., (2000) third category, indirect prior alliance experience. The exception to 
this trend is P3, which has developed a relatively new organization where there is a mix of 
agents from the beginning. A differently sized proportion of social capital is identified among 
this category.  
 
In local associations, prior social capital is less of a driver for being a part of the associations 
because members have been involved for generations. Nevertheless, new recruitment of 
members occurs and then it is almost exclusively a farmer that knows a fellow farmer that is a 
member of the association. This can be compared with all three categories presented by 
Chung et al., (2000) depending on who it concerns.   
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Social aspects that function as facilitators for the collaborations may be harder to quantify, but 
they regard feelings of security, social bonding, and trust. Many of the producer organizations 
states that the main driver for starting the collaborations circled around financial goals. 
However, the social aspects have grown stronger during the collaboration and is one of the 
main reasons for staying. Farmers in P2 and P3 talk about moral support from each other in 
the primary production and farmers from P1 and P4 emphasizes that the organization creates 
security and a closer community. The local associations interviewed in this study talk about 
the same things but mention further the collective feeling in a cooperative as a social aspect. 
All goes well with Michelv & Vilalta-Perdomo, (2016) theories surrounding collaboration. 
Beyond this, the respondents from P1 and L2 mention that the social relationships within the 
collaborations advocates technological development because they support and trigger each 
other. Many other aspects that are highlighted as social drivers when evaluating producer 
organizations. Primarily the collaboration generates a wider and closer network, as 
emphasized by P3A, which matches well with theories on network analysis (Nelson, 1989; 
Krackhardt, 1992). Social activities have been mentioned throughout as an important part of 
the social interaction and to varying degrees depending on how well the members know each 
other and how long the collaboration has been going on. Growing social relations in this way 
is a facilitator that drive the farmers to maintain the collaboration (De Toro & Rosenqvist, 
2005). It may also reduce transaction costs when searching for important information and 
provide new economic opportunities for the collaborators (Baker, 1994; Uzzi, 1996; Uzzi, 
1997). The infrastructure within the four producer organizations is influencing the dynamic 
between members in some cases to a certain extent. The organizations where members have 
solid areas of responsibility and joint ownership see this as an advantage as pointed out by 
Granovetter (1985). However, the infrastructure could be a factor that is perceived negatively 
by the members who are more dedicated to the organization. In the local associations, the 
social infrastructure is not discussed extensively. 
 
Another aspect, which affects the social context, is information exchange between 
participating parties within an organization or association (Simatupang & Sridharan, 2008). 
All respondents, representing producer organizations, consider it to be full transparency 
regarding information concerning the activities of the organization. This allows for decision 
synchronization which could lower costs and grant higher profitability for the participating 
members (Simatupang et al., 2002; Simatupang & Sridharan, 2008). In the local association, 
the degree of transparency varies according to the respondents. What varies most is how 
transparent the association is with different scales and prices towards its members. However, 
in addition to information about the business, the perception of what kind of information that 
enhances collaboration is varied. In the cases where the producer organization is more like a 
joint venture, there is a higher degree of transparency, which largely includes the entire 
individual operation. The same goes for the smaller associations. The bigger associations are 
less transparent because of more members. There are cases where the producer organization 
mainly function as a trading tool. In these cases, information distributed about the individual 
operation and production is more appreciated and may serve as an advisory consultant within 
the organization.  
 
5.1.2 Trust 
 
Trust is one of the most important aspects for maintaining collaboration and is the main 
reason to why collaborations fail (Barrat, 2004; Sahay, 2003) Fawcett (2012) has identified 
four key concepts for increasing trust in a collaboration. Namely by sharing information and 
resources, developing mutuality, keeping promises and acting honestly.  
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The state of the information flow between actors in a collaboration is essential for the state of 
the collaboration (Barrat, 2004). Nearly all the producer organizations distribute and share 
information regarding business and collaboration frequently, mostly via e-mail or phone. All 
the producer organization respondents speak of being completely trusting towards the 
information they receive from fellow collaborators and that the information is accurate. These 
responses are in line with Wiengarten et al. (2010) which emphasize factors as accuracy, 
timeliness, and relevance as important factors for the quality of the information flow.  
To achieve a good information quality, factors such as accuracy, timeliness, relevance and the 
added value of said information is needed (Wiengarten et al., 2010) 
 
Developing mutuality often revolves around tight connections and the feeling that every 
individual in a collaboration is gaining something from the joint efforts (Lambert et al., 
1996). In line with provided theory, the respondents argue that mutuality, in the form of 
perceiving that both parties gain from the collaboration, as well as the joint activities’ value 
where every individual contribution is vital for a collaboration to function. P1a and P3a 
mention that the collaboration would be impossible to maintain if not all the parties feel 
satisfied with what they got out of it. P2a also states that the importance that everyone is 
gaining something but the fact that some partners might gain more must be overlooked for the 
collaboration to be maintained. All the respondents perceive that the absolute majority of their 
organizations and associations receive benefits from their collaborative activities and believe 
that all collaborating partners do. This is in line with the theory stating that mutuality is one 
the vital cornerstones of collaboration as well as contributing to increased trust (Fawcett et al., 
2012). However, P3b states that more commitment is shown by a few of the members. The 
mutuality aspect is found in both economic and social drivers. The mutuality built between 
collaborators is a critical point of increasing trust in the formation (Fawcett et al., 2012). 
Lambert et al. (1996) further state that all the partners in a collaboration must perceive that 
they gain benefits and that they would not be able to achieve those benefits alone. These 
theoretical claims have been identified when interviewing the respondents.  
 
When regarding members in local associations, the perceived mutuality is also high. L3a and 
L4a stress the economic benefit of being a member of the association. While L1b and L2a 
mention that there might be members that would benefit from acting on their own but because 
of the social aspects, flexibility, and service they still use the association as their main trading 
channel.  
 
An atmosphere of openness and honesty is important for increased trust among collaborating 
partners along with the maintenance of said activity. (Fawcett et al., 2012) All of the producer 
organizations mention that all or most of the collaborators socialize and spend time with each 
other outside of work. Openness is perceived as a vital aspect to keep a high level of trust in 
the collaboration. P1a also mentions that transparency is the key to maintain a sustainable 
collaboration. Collaboration P1 emphasizes the strength of being able to admit to 
shortcomings, which they believe have made their collaboration stronger. P3b states that they 
share information about prices and similar business data since this is what the collaboration is 
focused on. All the respondents also trust their collaborating partners not to use the 
information shared between them in opportunistic ways. This is well connected to Fawcett et 
al. (2012) idea that all collaborating partners need to develop a trusting atmosphere, which 
reduces the risk of opportunistic behavior. 
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Openness in terms of local associations is different because of the structure in the 
organization. As the associations themselves sell production factors and buy grain, they are 
competing with other IOFS for their members as customers. However, most of the 
respondents point out that transparency in the pricing model is vital to earn the trust of the 
members. L1a and L4b also state that they make no difference at all between different 
members while L2a and L3a use discounts on transport regarding the capacity to fill an entire 
truck. However, the latter also express that if prices were to differ too many members would 
start to distrust the association. These activities also go well with Fawcett et al. (2012) theory 
regarding collaborative partners having to make an effort to develop a trusting atmosphere. 
However, there is still a level of secrecy towards members in order not to share prices with 
competitive firms.  
5.2 Cooperative relations 
 
5.2.1 Trust and loyalty 
 
Producer organizations have a varied opinion about the Lantmännen. Today, both P1a and 
P3a perceive Lantmännen as too large and that the member benefit for the individual farmer 
of the cooperative is fading. Meanwhile, P1b questions the situation of a producer 
organization being needed in the cooperative. The members’ perception is consistent with 
Feng et al. (2016) study, which concludes that the consequence of the inevitable growing 
phase of a cooperative is lower trust and commitment. The notion of Lantmännen being a 
secure market channel is agreed upon by all the of the producer organizations. This is one of 
the most vital aspects when regarding loyalty according to Morfi et al. (2015). The business 
orientation differs between organizations where P1 searches for offers from many actors on 
both production factors and grain. Respondents from P2 focus on good prices regarding 
production factors to their farms. P3 also accepts offers from various IOFS and Lantmännen 
but also keeps the cooperative ideology and their membership in mind when trading. P4 is a 
whole customer at Lantmännen and therefore does, at least, 80% of the business at 
Lantmännen. The rest, however, might be traded elsewhere. Even though they would like to 
benefit the cooperative through trade with IOFs may offer better prices and therefore is 
chosen. 
 
The respondents of the local associations all have good perception and a high level of trust 
towards Lantmännen as of today. All of them also view the cooperatives business activities as 
positive for the cooperative as a whole, where L1a and L3b express a sense of pride for being 
part of a leader in the market. The perception of the board is positive, especially compared to 
the climate of low trust from the beginning of the century when the fusion of the associations 
was debated. However, L1 and L2 both agree that Lantmännen might overlook the local 
associations in some aspects. In terms of loyalty, three of the four associations (L1, L2 and 
L4) have special contracts with Lantmännen specifying them to buy 80% of their production 
factors from the cooperative. Association L4, who does not have a contract, but still commits 
most trade to Lantmännen because of high rates of refunds and supplementary payments.  
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5.3 Concluding remarks 
 
In order to provide an overview of the analysis, a table consisting of the revealed characteristics of 
the analyzed collaborations is presented in table 15. The characteristics are divided into drivers 
and facilitators and further separated under each theory. First, the drivers for a collaboration is 
presented under financial aspects and social aspects, followed by facilitators, presented under 
internal trust, external trust and loyalty. The highlighted characteristics emphasize drivers and 
facilitators for producer organizations and local associations and reveal the differences between 
collaboration types. 
 
Table 15. Concluding remarks of analyzed results and characteristics of producer organizations and local 
associations. 
 
Drivers 
Producer organizations  Local associations 
 
Financial aspects  
Higher revenue High  Less high 
Bargaining power High High 
Synergy effects High  Low 
Financial aspects Longer credits Dividends, conditions  
 
 
 
Social aspects 
Prior social capital  High High 
Social structure  Strong ties, comfort, safety Network, co-op feeling  
Beneficial relationships Different competencies Service, flexibility  
Exchange of expertise and 
knowledge 
High  High 
Facilitators 
 
Internal trust 
Information sharing  High Low 
Mutuality High High 
Openness High Medium  
 
 
 
External trust 
Perception of co-op Medium  High 
Perception of business 
activities  
Medium low High 
Trust in representatives  Medium low High 
 
 
Loyalty 
Assured markets  High High 
Business orientation  Financial focus  Whole customer  
Co-op ideology  Low High 
Frequency of trade High High 
 
5.4 Discussion 
 
The results of this study suggest that the financial aspects of being a part of a producer 
organization and to some extent a local association is one of the main drivers. Thus it is 
possible to get somewhat better prices and conditions from Lantmännen through these kinds 
of constellations. Although this is completely in accordance with theories presented relating 
to financial aspects, the implications for the cooperative could be further discussed through 
the problems inherent in the traditional cooperative. Hence, this could be viewed as a kind of 
free-rider behaviour locking at the producer organizations because the members connected to 
these behave opportunistically towards the own cooperative by trying not to bear the full cost 
of their actions and still receive the full benefits they are entitled to (Cook, 1995; Royer, 
1999). This could be viewed as a short-term perspective on the cooperative model and 
therefore lead to a horizon problem (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). This reasoning is partly 
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supported by members mentioning that the producer organization is formed due to a 
perception of an underperforming cooperative where the return they receive from investments 
is less than the return generated by the assets, short-term (Cook, 1995; Royer, 1999). 
However, based on the empirical result gathered in this study it cannot be established that 
these problems exist in Lantmännen. 
 
During the interviews several of the respondents mention that they don’t have the same trust 
for Lantmännen as they had previously. Many of them also state that it stems from the 
organization being too big and complex today and that they feel that the social values are 
getting undermined. This goes in line with Nilsson et al. (2009) which brings up the problem 
with reduced trust in growing cooperatives. We can also see that the willingness to trade seem 
to decrease with the reduced trust and social capital, which is in line with Morfi et al. (2016). 
The fading social capital may also be a reason to the cooperative problems being more 
prominent in the modern cooperative. 
 
One of the cooperative problems, the control problem, based on the agent theory is something 
the authors brought up in the literature review. Agent theory is defined as the relationship 
between the principal and the agent, where agent on behalf of the principal manages the 
latter's interests (Cook, 1995). Larger cooperatives such as Lantmännen needs to employ 
management, which means that ownership and management are separated (Nilsson & 
Bjorklund, 2003). Assuming asymmetric information occurs, the agent has a knowledge 
advantage over the principal, which means that the agent can act opportunistically to gain 
wealth and influence. In a study of Lantmännen, Nilsson et al. (2009) presents theoretical 
arguments for Lantmännen's problems are related to its size and complexity of its activities, 
which may lead to a loss of confidence in the leadership of the cooperative. This problem can 
also be found in Kihlén’s study (2007) where the author finds that a rapidly growing 
cooperative, accompanied by a reduced sense of ownership held by members, creates 
disloyalty. However, some of the respondents in this study experience that this development 
has fluctuated in recent years and that they today have greater confidence in how Lantmännen 
EA is managed. A perception by the authors is that the level of trust towards Lantmännen 
varies in the producer organizations but is generally high in the local associations. However, 
most of the respondents emphasize that the trust in Lantmännen was far lower a couple of 
years ago which is in line with previous studies on members in Lantmännen (Friis, 2011; 
Kihlén, 2007). According to Cook (1995) five-stage cooperative life cycle low trust indicates 
that the cooperative is in the last stage of the life cycle and have to either dissolve the 
cooperatives initial characteristics and becoming an IOF or try to rebuild organizational trust 
to recreate social linkages. The empirical results indicate that Lantmännen has succeeded in 
the latter, with the local associations but still have to work on restoring trust among directly 
connected members.   
 
The empirics and result of this thesis show that loyalty towards Lantmännen is high in all of 
the collaborations due to a high frequency of trade. However, the authors perceive a 
difference between local associations and producer organizations where loyalty is depends on 
commitment in the case of local associations. Commitment has been defined by Fulton (1999, 
p. 423) as “the preference of cooperative members to patronize a cooperative even when the 
cooperative's price or service is not as good as that provided by an IOF.” This definition is 
well in line with how many of respondents from local associations perceive that the majority 
of their members act, even though it is not always beneficial to trade through the association. 
Both L1b and L2b states that sometimes it could be more beneficial to act as an independent 
producer. You could, therefore, argue that these members indirectly have a high commitment 
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towards Lantmännen due to the association’s level of commitment towards Lantmännen.  
Unlike most members of producer organizations, who would not buy from Lantmännen to 
patronize the cooperative, if an IOF would offer better conditions. Furthermore, there is more 
evidence pointing at a high level of commitment among members in local associations. 
Commitment incorporates a willingness to make a sacrifice to contribute to the organization's 
success (Solinger, van Olffen, & Roe, 2008). Therefore, committed members are more likely 
to make an effort towards a customer-oriented strategy, such as investing in quality 
improvement at the farm level. Which can be seen in, for example, L2 case, where they 
mention their well-developed work with N-sensor. However, this kind activity is solely an 
index on commitment directed towards other members in the associations and are in fact 
found to a larger extent in the producer organizations.   
 
To increase commitment from members towards Lantmännen the respondents that collaborate 
through producer organizations, in general, called for more member benefits and closer bonds 
to members on the regional level. According to Feng et al. (2016) social capital is negatively 
associated with cooperative size, which is somewhat consistent with what the respondents call 
for. As the empirics and results of this study also show, the local associations, that function as 
small cooperative, do not have these problems. Social capital is high in all the constellations 
participating in this study. These results of the thesis are in line with Feng et al. (2016) with 
regard to producer organizations. Chung et al., (2000) claims that prior social capital and 
strong ties between partners in a collaboration could be a beneficial way to initiate the 
partnership and this is more or less the case in all the collaborations in this thesis. Larsén, K. 
(2008) states in her study on 1000 Swedish farmers that good social relations categorize the 
collaboration partnerships they have. However, some of the producer organizations testify 
that they do not necessarily have to have good social relations to all members of the 
organization. Which is more in line with Chung et al., (2000) optimal strategy when 
developing partnership, where he suggests a mix of partners, consisting of both strong ties to 
the firm and others that are more distant.   
 
One thing that distinguishes producer organizations from local associations is that they are 
designed as a horizontal collaboration. Meanwhile the local associations work both horizontal 
and vertical in the supply chain. The empirical results in this thesis support the five concepts 
presented by Simatupang and Sridharan, (2008) when assessing local associations. Although 
the results also support Lazzarini et al., (2001) theory on netchain analysis. Thus the social 
structure in the producer organizations is more complex and is hard to compare with the 
larger local associations directly. The empirical results, however, point to that both 
constellation types justify their existence since Lantmännen’s vertical supply chain with a 
large number of actors included creates collaborative difficulties (Barratt. 2004). However, 
another dilemma, highlighted by Simatupang and Sridharan, (2004) is how to go about 
meeting the goals of the own business but also within the business of the collaborative 
partner. In the cases examined in this thesis, this dilemma is even more complex. Farmers do 
not only have to balance the interests of the own firm against the collaboration but also 
against the cooperation which they are members of.    
 
According to Lazzarini, et al., (2001) farmers tend to share less strategic information vertical 
in the supply chain and instead try to promote information sharing to favor the collaboration 
within the same layer. This is somewhat consistent with the empirical results of this thesis 
showing that local associations are slightly less keen on exchanging information with each 
other and with the management of the association compared tp producer organizations. This is 
due to a higher degree of social interactions among individual members. 
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6 Conclusions 
 
The study aims to increase the understanding of what factors drive farmers to collaborate 
through producer organizations, despite that they already are members of Lantmännen 
economic association. Moreover, to analyze what distinguishes producer organizations from 
local associations connected to Lantmännen. To answer the questions the following research 
questions were asked; (1) What are the drivers and maintaining factors for farmers 
collaborating through producer organization in negotiations? (2) How do new more local 
collaborations affect relationships with a larger established cooperative? (3) What 
distinguishes producer organizations from local associations connected to Lantmännen and 
are there any differences regarding trust towards Lantmännen?  
 
The drivers for creating and maintaining these collaborations are both financial and social. 
The financial driver and effects are mainly connected to higher revenue, received through 
joint negotiations which gives greater marketing power and better prices. The social aspects 
influencing the creation of these kinds of collaborations is categorized by prior strong social 
ties among partners. Although the results also show that social capital, regarding comfort and 
safety, is an important driver. Both producer organizations and local associations 
acknowledge this. Collaboration brings farmers together and invariably involve a greater 
degree of sharing between the collaborators. Sharing experience, market information, and 
knowledge is something that is found in all constellations participating in this study, which is 
well in line with theory.  
 
Trust is high in these kinds of constellations. Vulnerability and risks connected with the 
collaborative efforts are deemed as low. In line with Fawcett et al. (2012) theory about trust 
being enhanced by acts of information sharing, mutuality, and openness both kinds of 
organizations deem trust to be high in their respective structure. However, local associations 
face these problems, since the structure is not completely horizontal and more similar to a 
small cooperative.  
 
Concluding remarks of the relationship to the cooperative in terms of trust and loyalty are that 
the trust varies in the producer organizations but is generally high in the local associations. 
Even though the trust and cooperative ideology might be reduced in some collaborations, the 
frequency of trade to Lantmännen is in most cases high. Hence, Lantmännen has been able to 
provide reasonable prices and dividends during the last couple of years. However, the study 
shows that the frequency of trade mainly depends on financial aspects rather than a 
commitment to the cooperative. The financial aspects are of more importance to producer 
organizations than local associations.   
 
Some distinguishing differences have been identified between the local associations and 
producer organizations in terms of social structure, cooperative ideology and financial 
incentives to trade with Lantmännen. However, this thesis reveals the importance of both 
kinds of collaborations for the participating farmers. Therefore, the thesis highlights the 
importance of having a cooperative strategy for handling these kinds of constellations in the 
future.  
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7 Future research 
In the final chapter a few suggestions for future research developed from the results of this 
study is presented. 
 
Financial and social drivers have been identified as necessary for collaboration in this study. 
However, more in-depth studies could be made on both aspects. A quantitative study of the 
effects of joint negotiation contra being a single farmer might be an interesting topic to 
develop the field further. To further examine the decision synchronization and joint activities 
for producer organizations is also a suggested topic for further studies from the authors. 
 
Another interesting aspect is a more focused perspective of the common cooperative problems 
concerning these kinds of activities. The discussion of this study brings up some points about 
these perspectives but it could be a whole thesis in itself.  
 
Other suggestions for further research is to look at local associations with a cooperative lens 
and compare them to the national cooperative. In this study it is concluded that the smaller 
local associations offer a more dominant social sole and flexibility. However, this is not the 
focus of this study and therefore more interesting findings could be made with the right scope 
and cases.  
 50 
Biblography 
 
Literature and publications 
 
Addison, D. P., Lingham, T., Uslay, C., & Lee, O. F. (2017). An entrepreneurial relationship 
marketing approach to B2B selling: The case for intellectual capital sharing. Journal of 
Research in Marketing and Entrepreneurship, 19(1), 2-25. 
 
Adler, P.S. and S.W. Kwon, (1999). Social capital: the good, the bad, 
and the ugly. Working Paper available at http://www.ssrn.com 
 
Andersson, H., (2004). Ekonomiska vinster vid samverkan mellan lantbruksföretag, Uppsala: 
Sveriges lantbruksuniversitet. (SLU/Institutionen för ekonomi 2004: 68). ISSN:1104-
6082               
                                                   
Aitken, J., (1998). Supply Chain Integration within the Context of a Supplier Association. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Cranfield University. 
 
Bager, T., (1996). Organisations in sectors. Explaining the dissemination of populations of 
formal organization in economic sectors – bridging rational choice and institutional 
approaches. Esbjerg, Denmark: South Jutland University Press. 
 
Baker, W. E. (1994). Networking Smart: How to Build Relationships for Personal and 
Organizational Success. McGraw-Hill, New York. 
 
Barney, J. B., & Hansen, M. H., (1994). Trustworthiness as a source of competitive 
advantage. Strategic management journal, 15(S1), 175-190. 
 
Barratt, M., (2004). Understanding the meaning of collaboration in the supply chain. Supply 
Chain Management: An International Journal, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 30-42. 
 
Bhuyan, S., (2007). The people factor in cooperatives: an analysis of members’ attitudes and 
behavior. Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics 55(3): 275–298. 
 
Bonus, H., (1986). The cooperative association as a business enterprise: a study in the 
economics of transactions. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 142, 310-39. 
 
Bourdieu, P. and L. Wacquant (1992). An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology. University of 
Chicago Press, Chicago, IL 
 
Bryman, A., & Bell, E., (2015). Business Research Methods, 4th ed. Oxford Univ. Press. 
 
Burt, R. S., (1992). Structural Holes. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA 
 
Carlsson, G., Pettersson, O., Sandqvist, P., (2006). Maskinkostnader-en stor utgift som kan 
minskas. Rapport/JTI:114. Uppsala: Institutet för jordbruks- och miljöteknik forskar för bättre 
mat och miljö. 
 
 51 
Chung, S., Singh, H., & Lee, K., (2000). Complementarity, status similarity and social capital 
as drivers of alliance formation. Strategic management journal, 1-22. 
 
Coleman, J. S., (1990). Foundations of Social Theory. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 
MA. 
 
Cook, ML., (1995). The future of U.S. agricultural cooperatives: A neoinstitutional 
approach. American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77(5):1153-1159. 
 
Christopher, M. (1999). Logistics and Supply Chain Management: Strategies for Reducing 
Cost and Improving Service Financial Times: Pitman Publishing. London, 1998 ISBN 0 273 
63049 0 (hardback) 294+ 1× pp 
 
De Toro, A., & Rosenqvist, H. (2005). Maskinsamverkan–tre fallstudier. Rapport–miljö, 
teknik och lantbruk, 3. 
 
Dyer, J. H., (1997). Effective interfirm collaboration: how firms minimize transaction costs 
and maximize transaction value. Strategic management journal, 535-556. 
 
Dyer, J.H. and K. Nobeoka, (2000). Creating and managing a knowledge-sharing network: 
the Toyota case. Strategic Management Journal 21, 345-67. 
 
Dyer, J. H., & Chu, W., (2003). The role of trustworthiness in reducing transaction costs and 
improving performance: Empirical evidence from the United States, Japan, and Korea. 
Organization science, 14(1), 57-68. 
 
Ekman, S., & Gullstrand, J., (2006). Lantbruket och konkurrenskraften. Rapport 2006:4. 
Sveriges Livsmedelsekonomiska Institut (SLI). Lund. 
 
Ellram, L. M. (1995). Partnering pitfalls and success factors. Journal of Supply Chain 
Management, 31(1), 35-44. 
 
Fearne, A. (1998). The evolution of partnerships in the meat supply chain: insights from the 
British beef industry. Supply Chain Management: An International Journal, 3(4), 214-231. 
 
Feng, L., Friis, A., & Nilsson, J. (2016). Social capital among members in grain marketing 
cooperatives of different sizes. Agribusiness, 32(1), 113-126. 
 
Flyvbjerg, B. (2006). Five misunderstandings about case-study research. Qualitative inquiry, 
12(2), 219-245. 
 
Friis, A., (2011). Members´ view of farm cooperatives: a comparison between cooperatives 
with different size. Uppsala: SLU, Dept. of Economics 
 
Fulton, M. E., Fulton, J. R., Stephen Clark, J., & Parliament, C. (1995). Cooperative growth: 
Is it constrained?. Agribusiness, 11(3), 245-261. 
 
Fulton, M. (1999). Cooperatives and member commitment. LTA, 4(99), 418-437. 
 
 52 
Fulton, M., (1995). The future of cooperatives in Canada: A property rights approach. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 77, 1144–1152. 
 
Fulton, M., & Giannakas, K. (2001). Organizational commitment in a mixed oligopoly: 
Agricultural cooperatives and investor-owned firms. American journal of agricultural 
economics, 83(5), 1258-1265. 
 
Gaurwitsch, S., (2008). Årsredovisningen i kooperativa föreningar : läser medlemmarna 
Lantmännens årsredovisning?. SLU, Dept. of Economics, Uppsala. Uppsala: SLU, Dept. of 
Economics 
 
Given, L. M., (2008). The SAGE encyclopedia of qualitative research methods Thousand 
Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications Ltd doi: 10.4135/9781412963909 
 
Granovetter, M., (1973). The strength of weak ties. American Journal of Sociology 78, 1360-
80. 
 
Granovetter, M. S. (1985). 'Economic action and social structure: The problem of social 
embeddedness', American Journal of Sociology, 31, pp. 481-510. 
 
Gulati, R. (1995a). 'Does familiarity breed trust?: The implications of repeated ties for 
contractual choice in alliances', Academy of Management Journal, 38, pp. 85-112. 
 
Gulati, R., (1995). Social structure and alliance formation patterns: A longitudinal analysis. 
Administrative science quarterly, 619-652. 
 
Hamel, G., Y. L. Doz and C. K. Prahalad (1989). 'Collaborate with your competitors and 
win', Harvard Business Review, 67(1), pp. 137-139. 
 
Hansen, M. H., Morrow Jr, J. L., & Batista, J. C., (2002). The impact of trust on cooperative 
membership retention, performance, and satisfaction: an exploratory study. The International 
Food and Agribusiness Management Review, 5(1), 41-59. 
 
Harrigan, K. R. (1986). Managing for Join Ventures Success. Lexington Books, Lexington, 
MA. 
 
Harte, L. N., (1997). 3 Creeping Privatisation of Irish Co-operatives: A Transaction Cost 
Explanation. And structures in the agro-food industries, 32. 
 
Heide, J.B. and John, G. (1990), “Alliances in industrial purchasing: determinants of joint 
action in buyer‐supplier relationships”, Journal Marketing Research, Vol. 27 No. 1, pp. 24‐
36. 
Hind, A.M., (1997). The changing values of the cooperative and its business focus. American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 79, 1077–1082. 
 
Hind, A.M., (1999). Co-operative life cycle and goals. Journal of Agricultural Economics 50 
(3), 536–548. 
 53 
 
Hogarth-Scott, S. (1999). Retailer-supplier partnerships: hostages to fortune or the way 
forward for the millennium?. British food journal, 101(9), 668-682 
 
Iliopoulos, C., & Cook, ML., (1999). The internal organization of the cooperative firm: An 
extension of a new institutional digest. Journal of Cooperatives 14:77-85. 
 
James Jr. H.S., & Sykuta, M.E., (2006). Farmer trust in producer- and investor-owned firms: 
Evidence from Missouri corn and soybean producers. Agribusiness, an International Journal 
22:1, pp.135–153. 
 
Johansson, E., & Persson, K., (2013) Från maskinsamarbete till driftsbolag. Uppsala: SLU, 
Dept. of Economics 
 
Kihlén, A., (2007). Lantmännens nya medlemsorganisation: utvärdering ur ett 
medlemsperspektiv. SLU, Dept. of Economics, Uppsala. Uppsala: SLU, Dept. of Economics. 
 
Kogut, B. (1988). 'Joint ventures: Theoretical and empirical perspectives', Strategic 
Management Jour- nal, 9(4), pp. 319-332. 
 
Karantininis, K., & Zago, A. (2001). Endogenous membership in mixed duopsonies. 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 83(5), 1266-1272. 
 
Krackhardt, D., (1992). The strength of strong ties: the importance of philos in organizations. 
In Nohria, N. and R. G. Eccles, Networks and Organizations, Boston, Harvard University 
Press, 216-39. 
 
Lambert, D. M., Emmelhainz, M. A., & Gardner, J. T. (1996). Developing and implementing 
supply chain partnerships. The international Journal of Logistics management, 7(2), 1-18. 
Larsén, K., (2008). Economic consequences of collaborative arrangements in the agricultural 
firm. Diss. (sammanfattning/summary) Uppsala : Sveriges lantbruksuniv., Acta Universitatis 
agriculturae Sueciae, 1652-6880 ; 2008:28, ISBN 978-91-85913-61-9. 
 
Larsson, Charlotte and Lidebjer, Louise. (2015). Members’ incentives to trade and invest in 
cooperative societies: a comparison between Lantmännen and Södra Skogsägarna. Second 
cycle, A1E. Uppsala: SLU, Dept. of Economics 
 
Lazzarini, S., Chaddad, F., & Cook, M. (2001). Integrating supply chain and network 
analyses: the study of netchains. Journal on chain and network science, 1(1), 7-22. 
 
Lewis-Beck, M. S., Bryman, A., & Futing Liao, T., (2004). The SAGE encyclopedia of social 
science research methods : SAGE Publications Ltd doi: 10.4135/9781412950589 
 
Lindkvist, M., & Stråkander, P., (2016). Förändring i försäljningsstrategi hos medlemmar i 
Lantmännen : vad är effekten av informationsasymmetri?. First cycle, G2E. Uppsala: SLU, 
Dept. of Economics 
 
 54 
Lijphart, A., (1971). Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method, The American 
Political Science Review, Vol. 65, No. 3. 
 
LRF Konsult., (2015). Lantbrukets Lönsamhet Preliminärt 2015 November. 
McAllister, D. J., (1995). Affect-and cognition-based trust as foundations for interpersonal 
cooperation in organizations. Academy of management journal, 38(1), 24-59. 
 
Michelv, R., & Vilalta-perdomo, E. L. (2016). An initial exploration on the drivers for 
integrating small-farmers in supply chains and networks: Propensity to collaborate. 
 
Merriam, S.B. (1994). Fallstudien som forskningsmetod. Lund, Sverige: Studentlitteratur AB 
 
Morfi, C., Ollila, P., Nilsson, J., Feng, L., & Karantininis, K. (2015). Motivation Behind 
Members’ Loyalty to Agricultural Cooperatives. In Interfirm Networks (pp. 173-190). 
Springer, Cham 
 
Naesens, K., Pintelon, L. & Taillieu, T. (2007). A Framework for Implementing and 
Sustaining Trust in Horizontal Partnerships. Supply Chain Forum: An International Journal, 
Vol.8 No 1, pp. 32-44. 
 
Nelson, R.E., (1989). The strength of strong ties: social networks and intergroup conflict in 
organizations. Academy of Management Journal 32, 377-401. 
 
Neto, S. B., & Bachmann, R., (2016). The role of trust in cooperative organization’s life 
cycle. International summit of cooperatives, Quebec. 
 
Newton, K. (2001). Trust, social capital, civil society, and democracy. International Political 
Science Review, 22(2), 201-214 
 
Nilsson, J., & Björklund, T., (2003). Kan kooperationen klara konkurrensen? Om 
marknadsorientering i livsmedelssektorn. Uppsala: Institutionen för Ekonomi, SLU. 
 
Nilsson, J., Kihlén, A., & Norell, L. (2009). Are traditional cooperatives an endangered 
species? About shrinking satisfaction, involvement and trust. International Food and 
Agribusiness Management Review, 12(4). 
 
Nohria, N., (1992). Introduction: is a network perspective a useful way to studying 
organizations? In Nohria, N. and R.G. Eccles, Networks and Organizations, Boston, Harvard 
University Press, 1-22. 
 
Nohria, N. and C. Garcia-Pont (1991). 'Global strategic linkages and industry structure', 
Strategic Manage- ment Journal, Summer Special Issue, 12, pp. 105- 124. 
 
Ollila, P., Nilsson, J., & Hess, S. (2014). Farmers' reactions to the internationalisation of 
cooperatives. Agricultural and Food Science. 
 
Ortmann, G. F., & King, R. P. (2007). Agricultural cooperatives II: can they facilitate access 
of small-scale farmers in South Africa to input and product markets?. Agrekon, 46(2), 219-
244. 
 
 55 
Pennings, H., K. Lee and A. Witteloostuijn (1998). 'Human capital, social capital, and firm 
dissolution', Academy of Management Journal, 41, pp. 425-440. 
 
Porter, M. E. and M. B. Fuller (1986). 'Coalitions and global strategy'. In M. E. Porter (ed.), 
Competition in Global Industry. Harvard Business School Press, Boston, MA, pp. 315-344. 
Porter, P. K., & Scully, G. W. (1987). Economic efficiency in cooperatives. The Journal of 
law and economics, 30(2), 489-512. 
 
Powell, W.W., (1990). Neither market nor hierarchy: network forms of organization. 
Research in Organizational Behavior 12, 295-336. 
 
Richardson, G. B. (1972). 'The organization of indus- try', Economic Journal, 82, pp. 883-
897. 
 
Riege, A.M., 2003. Validity and reliability tests in case study research: a literature review 
with "hands-on" applications for each research phase, Qualitative Market Research: An 
International Journal, vol. 6, pp. 75–86 
 
Robson, C. (2011). Real World Research. 3. Uppl. Chichester: Wiley (ISBN 978-1-4051-
8241-6). 
 
Royer, JS. (1999). Cooperative organizational strategies: A neo-institutional 
digest. Journal of Cooperatives 14:44-67. 
 
Sabel, C. F., (1993). Studied trust: Building new forms of cooperation in a volatile economy. 
Human relations, 46(9), 1133-1170. 
 
Sako, M., (1992). Price, quality and trust: Inter-firm relations in Britain and Japan (No. 18). 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Sahay, B. S., (2003). Understanding trust in supply chain relationships. Industrial 
Management & Data Systems, 103(8), 553-563. 
 
Sexton, R. J., & Iskow, J., (1993). The competitive role of cooperatives in market-oriented 
economies: A policy analysis. Agricultural cooperatives in transition, 55-83. 
 
Simatupang, T. M. & Sridharan, R., (2002). The collaborative supply chain. The International 
Journal of Logistics Management, Vol. 13 Iss 1 pp. 15-30. 
 
Simatupang, T. M & Sridharan, R. 2004. A benchmarking scheme for supply chain 
collaboration. Benchmarking: An International Journal, Vol. 11 Iss 1 pp. 9-30.  
 
Simatupang, T. M & Sridharan, R. 2008. Design for supply chain collaboration. Business 
Process Management Journal, Vol. 14 Iss 3 pp. 401-418. 
 
Simchi-Levi, D., P. Kaminski and E. Simchi-Levi., (2000). Designing and Managing the 
Supply Chain: Concepts, Strategies, and Case Studies. New York, Irwin McGraw-Hill 
 
Shenton, A.K., (2004). Strategies for ensuring trustworthiness in qualitative research 
projects. Education for information 22, 63-75. 
 56 
Smeltzer, L. R. (1997). The meaning and origin of trust in buyer‐supplier relationships. 
Journal of Supply Chain Management, 33(4), 40-48. 
Staatz, J.M., (1987). The structural characteristics of farmer cooperatives and their 
behavioral consequences. In Royer, J. S. (ed.), Cooperative Theory: New Approaches, 
Service Report 18, Washington, DC: USDA Agricultural Cooperative Service, 33-60. 
Stickel, D., Mayer, R., & Sitkin, S. (2010). 12. Understanding social capital: in whom do we 
trust?. Social capital: reaching out, reaching in. 
 
Stuart, I., P. Deckert, D. McCutcheon and R. Kunst., (1998). Case study: a leveraged learning 
network. Sloan Management Review 4, 81-93. 
 
Svendsen, G. L., & Svendsen, G. T., (2000). Measuring Social Capital: The Danish Co‐
operative Dairy Movement. Sociologia Ruralis, 40(1), 72-86. 
Szabó, G. G., (2009). The importance and role of trust in agriculture producer-owned 
organisations. In Conference on Transition in Agriculture-Agricultural Economics in 
Transition VI, Institute of Economics, Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Budapest (pp. 6-7). 
 
Tung, W., Capella, L.M., & Tat, K.T., (1997). Service pricing: a multi-step synthetic 
approach. Journal of service marketing, 11(1), 53-65. 
 
Uzzi, B., (1996). The sources and consequences of embeddedness for the economic 
performance of organizations: The network effect, American Socio- logical Review, 61, pp. 
674-698. 
 
Uzzi, B., (1997). Social structure and competition in interfirm networks: The paradox of 
embeddedness, Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, pp. 35-67 
 
Van der Krogt, D., Nilsson, J., & Høst, V. (2007). The impact of cooperatives' risk aversion 
and equity capital constraints on their inter‐firm consolidation and collaboration strategies—
with an empirical study of the European dairy industry. Agribusiness, 23(4), 453-472. 
 
Vitaliano, P., (1983). Cooperative enterprise: an alternative conceptual basis for analyzing a 
complex institution. American journal of agricultural economics, 65(5), 1078-1083. 
Wasserman, S. and K. Faust., (1994). Social Network Analysis. Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Whipple, J. M., & Frankel, R., (2000). Strategic alliance success factors. Journal of supply 
chain management, 36(2), 21-28. 
 
Williamson, O. E., (1981). The economics of organization: The transaction cost approach. 
American journal of sociology, 87(3), 548-577. 
 
Williamson, O. E., (1985). The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, 
Relational Contracting. Free Press, New York. 
 
Wilson, P. N. (2000). Social capital, trust, and the agribusiness of economics. Journal of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, 1-13. 
 
 57 
Woolcock, M. (1998). Social capital and economic development: Toward a theoretical 
synthesis and policy framework. Theory and society, 27(2), 151-208. 
 
Xu, L. & Beamon, B.M., (2006). Supply chain coordination and cooperation mechanisms: an 
attribute‐based approach. Journal of Supply Chain Management 42.1: 4-12. 
 
Yin, R.K., (2013). Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 5th ed., SAGE Publications, 
London (ISBN 1452242569) 
 
Yin, R. K., (2009). How to do better case studies. The SAGE handbook of applied social 
research methods, 2, 254-282. 
 
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., & Perrone, V., (1998). Does trust matter? Exploring the effects of 
interorganizational and interpersonal trust on performance. Organization Science, 9(2), 141–
159. doi:10.1287/orsc.9.2.141 
Internet 
ATL www.atl.nu 
1.Lönsamt att gå ihop och förhandla om priser 2011-04-04 
http://www.atl.nu/synpunkten/lonsamt-att-ga-ihop-och-forhandla-om-priser/ 
[2017-12-06] 
 
2. Framtidens bönder jobbar ihop, 2000-11-14 
http://www.atl.nu/lantbruk/framtidens-bonder-jobbar-ihop/ 
[ 2017-12-06] 
 
European Comission www.ec.europa.eu 
1. Producer Organisations and Associations of Producer Organisations 2017-02-22 
https://ec.europa.eu/agriculture/producer-interbranch-organisations/producer-organisations-
association_en 
[2017-12-01] 
 
(www, Alvseredslantman, 2018; www, Harplingelantman, 2018; www, Koingelantman, 
2018) 
 
Lantbruksforskning 
1 Slutrapport för projektet ”Samverkan, integration och ekonomisk anpassning i uthålla 
lantbruksföretag” (Diarienummer 0134001) 
https://login.lantbruksforskning.se/sbs/projectbank/downloadPb?appFormId=402880f6485f65
ff01485f85e6295d68  
[2018-01-25] 
 
Köinge Lantmän 
http://www.koingelantman.se/ 
[hämtad 2018-08-01] 
 
 
Lantmännen www.lantmannen.com 
1. Vår historia går från jord till bord 
 58 
http://lantmannen.com/om-lantmannen/historia/ 
[2018-01-14] 
 
2. Lantmännens Bokslutskommuniké, Januari–december 
http://lantmannen.com/siteassets/documents/...lantmannen/.../bokslutskommunike-2016.pdf 
[2018-01-14] 
 
3. Att äga Lantmännen 2017, 2018-02-01 
https://lantmannen.com/vara-agare/medlemskap/bli-medlem/ 
[2018-02-01] 
 
4. Värdet vi skapar, 2018-02-05 
https://lantmannen.com/vara-agare/medlemskap/utdelning/ 
[2018-02-10] 
 
5. Mer om begrepp, 2018-02-05 
https://lantmannen.com/vara-agare/tidningen-grodden/emissionsskola-lektion-1/ 
[2018-02-10] 
 
Lantmännen, Annual review 2017. 
https://lantmannen.com/om-lantmannen/finansiell-information/ars-och-
hallbarhetsredovisningar/  
[2018-03-15] 
 
Jordbruksaktuellt  www.ja.se 
1. Koncernens ryggrad: Lantmännen Lantbruk, 2017-03-16 
http://www.ja.se/artikel/30291/koncernens-ryggrad-lantmannen-lantbruk.html 
[hämtad 2017-03-11] 
 
2. Danskar pressar priserna tillsammans, 2017-03-16 
http://www.ja.se/artikel/48191/danskar-pressar-priserna-tillsammans.html 
[hämtad 2017-03-11] 
 
3. Svenska lantbrukare samarbetar gärna 2005-12-05 
http://www.ja.se/artikel/24882/svenska-lantbrukare-samarbetar-garna.html 
[hämtad 2017-12-06] 
 
Harplinge Lantmän 
http://www.harplingelantman.se/ 
[hämtad 2018-08-01] 
 
Älvsered Lantmän 
http://www.alvseredslantman.se/ 
[hämtad 2018-08-01] 
Personal message 
Personal message: On how local associations works towards and trades with Lantmännen. 
Also in comparison with other members in Lantmännen. 
Name: Sven Hellberg 
 59 
Position: Mail 
Date: 2018-02-04 
 
 60 
Appendix 1. Case study protocol 
 
Cases 
Producer organizations and local associations. 
 
Case study background 
Presented in the beginning of chapter 5. 
 
Data collection method 
Semi-structured, face-to-face interviews 
 
Data collection procedure 
-March 27, 2018 – interview with both respondents of producer organization P2 at the 
respondents’ farms. 
 
-March 28, 2018 – interview with both respondents of producer organization P1 at the 
respondents’ farms. 
 
-April 11, 2018 – traveled to Scania to prepare for interviews with our second case group, the 
local associations. 
 
-April 11, 2018 – interview with both respondents from local association L1 at the site of the 
association. 
 
-April 12, 2018 – interview with both respondents from local association L2 at the site of the 
association. 
 
-April 12, 2018 – interview with both respondents from local association L3 at the site of the 
association. 
 
-April 13, 2018 – interview with both respondents from local association L4 at the site of the 
association. 
 
-April 16, 2018 – interview with both respondents from producer organization P3 at the 
respondents’ farms. 
 
-April 18, 2018 – interview with both respondents from producer organization P4 at the 
respondents’ farms. 
 
-May 5 – transcripts sent to respondents 
 
Ethical considerations 
-Interviews with farmers are anonymous. 
-Respondents were told that they could stop the interview or skip questions. 
-Respondents has to know that they are being recorded. 
-Respondents has to be aware of the purpose of the study and how their responses will be 
used. 
 
Interview guide 
Appendix 2 
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Appendix 2. Interview guide 
 
1. Background 
1.1 Name and age? 
1.2 Name of the organization you represent? 
1.2 For how long have you been a part of the organization/association? 
1.3 What type of corporate structure is the organization/association? 
1.4 Are you a member of Lantmännen? 
1.5 Are you a part of/own an agriculture firm? 
1.6 Have you had other assignments/employments outside of the organization? 
1.7 What educational background do you have? 
 
1.A Producer Organizations 
1.a.a Why and how was the organization formed? 
1.a.b What are the organization’s business concept and goals (economic, productive, social)? 
1.a.c When was the producer organization started? 
1.a.d To what extent do you/your business collaborate with the partners today? 
1.a.e How many collaborators does the organization have? 
1.a.f Have the organization any requirements on farmer who want to collaborate? 
1.a.g How much time and commitment is needed by the collaborators to manage the 
organization? 
1.a.h Where does the organization operate? 
 
1.B Local Associations 
1.b.a Why was the association formed? 
1.b.b What are the association's business concept and goals (economic, productive, social)? 
1.b.c In what way do members in the association collaborate? 
1.b.d How many members do the association have?  
1.b.e What are the requirement to be a member in the association? 
1.b.f How much time and commitment is needed by the members/board to manage the 
association? 
1.b.g Where do the association operate? 
 
2. A. Drivers for Producer Organizations 
2.a.a What drives the collaborators to operate as an organization? 
2.a.b Has the organization affected your business? 
2.a.c What do you think has been most positively and negatively with the organizations? 
2.a.d What do you recognize as the greatest value of the collaboration? 
 
Financial aspects 
2.a.e How has trading through the organization affected your way of trading produced 
products and production means with Lantmännen and other actors? 
2.a.f Are there any differences between trading produced products and production means? 
2.a.g How would you say that your prices have changed by collaborate through the 
organization? If yes; in what way and how much? 
2.a.h Is there any other economic gains in your firm due to collaboration through the 
organization? 
2.a.i Is there any trades within the organization? If yes; of what kind and how is it set up? 
 
Social aspects 
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2.a.j Did you know each other before the collaboration? 
2.a.k Do you experience a greater social bound with the collaborators through interaction in 
the organization? 
2.a.l Do your own business collaborate with farmers in several other forms? 
2.b.m Has the collaboration allowed for an increased information exchange? If yes; What 
kind of information? 
2.a.n How is information distributed, accessed and used? 
2.a.o Do you experience that you are learning, receive knowledge from other members in the 
organization? If yes; What are you learning? 
2.a.p Are the communication and decision process factors that have affected the choice to 
collaborate? If yes: How and why? 
 
2.B. Drivers for Local Associations  
2.b.a What are the drivers for operating as a local association? 
2.b.b What are the benefits for members in your association compared to members directly 
connected to Lantmännen? 
2.b.c What do you define as the advantages and disadvantages with the association?  
2.b.d What do you recognize as the greatest value as member of the association? 
 
Financial aspects 
2.b.e How is the financial allocation structured and distributed to members?  
2.b.f Does the financial allocation differentiates itself from Lantmännen? If yes; How? 
2.b.g How is the organization trading produced products and production means with 
Lantmännen/other actors? 
2.b.h Are there any differences between trading produced products and production means? 
2.b.i Are there any trades within the association? If yes; Of what kind and how is it set up? 
2.b.j What financial advantages are created for the members in the association compared to 
trading as a individual agriculture firm? 
 
Social aspects 
2.b.k Do you recognize any social values of being a member in the association? If yes; What 
kind of values and how are they created? 
2.b.l How is information distributed, accessed and used? 
2.b.m Would you say that being a part of the association gives, increased information and 
knowledge exchange for members? If yes; What kind of information and knowledge? 
2.b.n Do you have regular member meetings? If yes; how often does these meeting occur and 
what type of questions are raised? 
2.b.o How much and what kind of influence do the members have over the association? 
2.b.p How are improvement suggestions by members handled by the association? 
2.b.q Do you have frequent follow-ups on how the members feel about the association? If yes; 
How is it measured? 
 
3. Trust between collaborators (Internal trust) 
4.1 Are the collaborating parties joined by a contract? 
4.2 Are there any bylaws stipulated in the organization? If yes; what areas do they concern? 
4.3 Are conversations with a collaborative partner only regarding work or also revolving 
personal reasons? 
4.4 Do you share business information about quantity, prices and quality between 
collaborators regularly? 
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4.5 Do you trust that members in your organization/association share information in a 
satisfying way? 
4.6 Do you trust that the information shared is honest and correct? 
4.7 Do you trust that information you get from other members in the organizations is time 
relevant?  
4.8 Do you trust that information you provide to the organization is not used in an 
unsatisfying way? 
4.9 Do you trust that your collaboration/membership and information sharing is not a risk to 
your own business? 
4.10 Do you trust that members contributes to the organization/association in a satisfying 
way? 
4.11 Do you experience that you contribute to the organization/association in a satisfying 
way? 
4.12 Do you experience that all the collaborators are benefiting from the collaboration? 
4.13 How are variations in quantity and quality handled in the collaboration? 
 
5 Trust towards cooperatives & loyalty (External trust) 
5.1 For how long have you been a member of Lantmännen? 
5.2 What is your general opinion regarding Lantmännen economic organization? 
5.3 What do you think about the different activities Lantmännen have in their portfolio? 
5.4 Are you satisfied with the proﬁtability that your agriculture firm/local association gains 
solely, from being a member in Lantmännen? In what way? 
5.5 As a member in Lantmännen do you trust that the board works in the best interests of the 
members?  
5.6 Do you trust that the elected representatives in Lantmännen works in the best interests of 
the members? 
5.7 Do you trust that information shared with Lantmännen will not be used in an unsatisfying 
way? 
5.8 Do you trust that information regarding your membership concerning e.g. decision power, 
dividends, opportunities, are shared with you in a satisfying way?  
5.9 Do you trust that you will get the best possible price trading with Lantmännen, by being a 
member? If not: Do you think you will gain a better result by negotiating through a 
collaboration?  
5.10 How satisfied are you with Lantmännen as a trading partner (prices, accessibility & 
reception)? 
 
Loyalty 
5.11 Do you prefer to trade with Lantmännen before other actors? 
5.12 How often do your collaboration take in offers from other actors? 
5.13 How often do your collaboration trade with other actors? 
5.14 Do you view Lantmännen as an assured channel for your products? 
5.15 Do you have invested capital in Lantmännen? If yes; Are you satisfied with what the 
investment generates?  
5.16 Are you satisfied with the dividend you get as a member from trading with Lantmännen? 
5.17 How do you see your organization/association develop in the future (5-10 years)? 
5.18 How do you see Lantmännen develop in the future (5-10 years)? 
 
